v0.6.50: ppt/doc/pdf worker isolation, docs, chat, sidebar improvements

.claude/rules/global.md

@@ -30,5 +30,25 @@ const shortId = generateShortId()
 const tiny = generateShortId(8)
 ```
 
+## Common Utilities
+Use shared helpers from `@/lib/core/utils/helpers` instead of writing inline implementations:
+
+- `sleep(ms)` — async delay. Never write `new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, ms))`
+- `toError(value)` — normalize unknown caught values to `Error`. Never write `e instanceof Error ? e : new Error(String(e))`
+- `toError(value).message` — get error message safely. Never write `e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e)`
+
+```typescript
+// ✗ Bad
+await new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, 1000))
+const msg = error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error)
+const err = error instanceof Error ? error : new Error(String(error))
+
+// ✓ Good
+import { sleep, toError } from '@/lib/core/utils/helpers'
+await sleep(1000)
+const msg = toError(error).message
+const err = toError(error)
+```
+
 ## Package Manager
 Use `bun` and `bunx`, not `npm` and `npx`.

.cursor/rules/global.mdc

@@ -37,5 +37,25 @@ const shortId = generateShortId()
 const tiny = generateShortId(8)
 ```
 
+## Common Utilities
+Use shared helpers from `@/lib/core/utils/helpers` instead of writing inline implementations:
+
+- `sleep(ms)` — async delay. Never write `new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, ms))`
+- `toError(value)` — normalize unknown caught values to `Error`. Never write `e instanceof Error ? e : new Error(String(e))`
+- `toError(value).message` — get error message safely. Never write `e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e)`
+
+```typescript
+// ✗ Bad
+await new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, 1000))
+const msg = error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error)
+const err = error instanceof Error ? error : new Error(String(error))
+
+// ✓ Good
+import { sleep, toError } from '@/lib/core/utils/helpers'
+await sleep(1000)
+const msg = toError(error).message
+const err = toError(error)
+```
+
 ## Package Manager
 Use `bun` and `bunx`, not `npm` and `npx`.

.cursor/rules/sim-sandbox.mdc

@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+---
+description: Isolated-vm sandbox worker security policy. Hard rules for anything that lives in the worker child process that runs user code.
+globs: ["apps/sim/lib/execution/isolated-vm-worker.cjs", "apps/sim/lib/execution/isolated-vm.ts", "apps/sim/lib/execution/sandbox/**", "apps/sim/sandbox-tasks/**"]
+---
+
+# Sim Sandbox — Worker Security Policy
+
+The isolated-vm worker child process at
+`apps/sim/lib/execution/isolated-vm-worker.cjs` runs untrusted user code inside
+V8 isolates. The process itself is a trust boundary. Everything in this rule is
+about what must **never** live in that process.
+
+## Hard rules
+
+1. **No app credentials in the worker process**. The worker must not hold, load,
+   or receive via IPC: database URLs, Redis URLs, AWS keys, Stripe keys,
+   session-signing keys, encryption keys, OAuth client secrets, internal API
+   secrets, or any LLM / email / search provider API keys. If you catch yourself
+   `require`'ing `@/lib/auth`, `@sim/db`, `@/lib/uploads/core/storage-service`,
+   or anything that imports `env` directly inside the worker, stop and use a
+   host-side broker instead.
+
+2. **Host-side brokers own all credentialed work**. The worker can only access
+   resources through `ivm.Reference` / `ivm.Callback` bridges back to the host
+   process. Today the only broker is `workspaceFileBroker`
+   (`apps/sim/lib/execution/sandbox/brokers/workspace-file.ts`); adding a new
+   one requires co-reviewing this file.
+
+3. **Host-side brokers must scope every resource access to a single tenant**.
+   The `SandboxBrokerContext` always carries `workspaceId`. Any new broker that
+   accesses storage, DB, or an external API must use `ctx.workspaceId` to scope
+   the lookup — never accept a raw path, key, or URL from isolate code without
+   validation.
+
+4. **Nothing that runs in the isolate is trusted, even if we wrote it**. The
+   task `bootstrap` and `finalize` strings in `apps/sim/sandbox-tasks/` execute
+   inside the isolate. They must treat `globalThis` as adversarial — no pulling
+   values from it that might have been mutated by user code. The hardening
+   script in `executeTask` undefines dangerous globals before user code runs.
+
+## Why
+
+A V8 JIT bug (Chrome ships these roughly monthly) gives an attacker a native
+code primitive inside the process that owns whatever that process can reach.
+If the worker only holds `isolated-vm` + a single narrow workspace-file broker,
+a V8 escape leaks one tenant's files. If the worker holds a Stripe key or a DB
+connection, a V8 escape leaks the service.
+
+The original `doc-worker.cjs` vulnerability (CVE-class, 225 production secrets
+leaked via `/proc/1/environ`) was the forcing function for this architecture.
+Keep the blast radius small.
+
+## Checklist for changes to `isolated-vm-worker.cjs`
+
+Before landing any change that adds a new `require(...)` or `process.send(...)`
+payload or `ivm.Reference` wrapper in the worker:
+
+- [ ] Does it load a credential, key, connection string, or secret? If yes,
+      move it host-side and expose as a broker.
+- [ ] Does it import from `@/lib/auth`, `@sim/db`, `@/lib/uploads/core/*`,
+      `@/lib/core/config/env`, or any module that reads `process.env` of the
+      main app? If yes, same — move host-side.
+- [ ] Does it expose a resource that's workspace-scoped without taking a
+      `workspaceId`? If yes, re-scope.
+- [ ] Did you update the broker limits (`IVM_MAX_BROKER_ARGS_JSON_CHARS`,
+      `IVM_MAX_BROKER_RESULT_JSON_CHARS`, `IVM_MAX_BROKERS_PER_EXECUTION`) if
+      the new broker can emit large payloads or fire frequently?
+
+## What the worker *may* hold
+
+- `isolated-vm` module
+- Node built-ins: `node:fs` (only for reading the checked-in bundle `.cjs`
+  files) and `node:path`
+- The three prebuilt library bundles under
+  `apps/sim/lib/execution/sandbox/bundles/*.cjs`
+- IPC message handlers for `execute`, `cancel`, `fetchResponse`,
+  `brokerResponse`
+
+The worker deliberately has **no host-side logger**. All errors and
+diagnostics flow through IPC back to the host, which has `@sim/logger`. Do
+not add `createLogger` or console-based logging to the worker — it would
+require pulling the main app's config / env, which is exactly what this
+rule is preventing.
+
+Anything else is suspect.

CLAUDE.md

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ You are a professional software engineer. All code must follow best practices: a
 - **Comments**: Use TSDoc for documentation. No `====` separators. No non-TSDoc comments
 - **Styling**: Never update global styles. Keep all styling local to components
 - **ID Generation**: Never use `crypto.randomUUID()`, `nanoid`, or `uuid` package. Use `generateId()` (UUID v4) or `generateShortId()` (compact) from `@/lib/core/utils/uuid`
+- **Common Utilities**: Use shared helpers from `@/lib/core/utils/helpers` instead of inline implementations. `sleep(ms)` for delays, `toError(e)` to normalize caught values.
 - **Package Manager**: Use `bun` and `bunx`, not `npm` and `npx`
 
 ## Architecture

apps/docs/components/ui/action-media.tsx

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 'use client'
 
-import { useState } from 'react'
+import { useRef, useState } from 'react'
 import { cn, getAssetUrl } from '@/lib/utils'
 import { Lightbox } from './lightbox'
 
@@ -50,18 +50,22 @@ export function ActionImage({ src, alt, enableLightbox = true }: ActionImageProp
 }
 
 export function ActionVideo({ src, alt, enableLightbox = true }: ActionVideoProps) {
+  const videoRef = useRef<HTMLVideoElement>(null)
+  const startTimeRef = useRef(0)
   const [isLightboxOpen, setIsLightboxOpen] = useState(false)
   const resolvedSrc = getAssetUrl(src)
 
   const handleClick = () => {
     if (enableLightbox) {
+      startTimeRef.current = videoRef.current?.currentTime ?? 0
       setIsLightboxOpen(true)
     }
   }
 
   return (
     <>
       <video
+        ref={videoRef}
         src={resolvedSrc}
         autoPlay
         loop
@@ -80,6 +84,7 @@ export function ActionVideo({ src, alt, enableLightbox = true }: ActionVideoProp
           src={src}
           alt={alt}
           type='video'
+          startTime={startTimeRef.current}
         />
       )}
     </>