feat(auth): wire OAuth authorization-code flow into App.tsx (#1379)#1383
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) Reloading the web client at the bare URL (no `?MCP_INSPECTOR_API_TOKEN=…` query string) with empty sessionStorage made every `/api/*` request 401 — the browser had no way to recover the backend's auth token. Embed the token into `index.html` on every page load so the browser no longer depends on the query string surviving navigation: - New shared helper `clients/web/server/inject-auth-token.ts` embeds `<script>window.__INSPECTOR_API_TOKEN__ = "…"</script>` (escaped against `</script>` injection; no-op when auth is dangerously omitted). - Dev: the Vite plugin injects via `transformIndexHtml`. - Prod: the Hono server injects on the `/` route. - `App.tsx` `getAuthToken()` now reads the injected global first, then the query string, then sessionStorage (both fallbacks preserved). - Shared global name lives in `INSPECTOR_API_TOKEN_GLOBAL` (`core/mcp/remote/constants.ts`). Tests: helper unit coverage + an integration test exercising the real prod server's `/` → `/api/*` flow (injected token authenticates; missing token 401s). AGENTS.md documents the token-recovery order. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
OAuth-protected MCP servers could not be connected to from the v2 web
client: the core OAuth pipeline exists, but App.tsx never invoked it, so a
connect attempt 401'd and surfaced "Remote send failed (401): … Missing
Authorization header" as a toast.
Wire the two missing entry points (all core primitives already in place):
- Auto-trigger on 401: in onToggleConnection's catch, detect an upstream
401 (isUnauthorizedError) and call client.authenticate(), which runs
discovery + DCR (backend-proxied) and redirects the page to the auth
server via BrowserNavigation. The initiating server id is persisted to
sessionStorage first, since the OAuth `state` carries only mode+authId
and the full-page redirect wipes React state.
- /oauth/callback handler: a mount effect that, once `servers` hydrate,
parses the callback params, recovers the pending server, rebuilds its
InspectorClient, runs completeOAuthFlow(code) (PKCE verifier + DCR client
info survive in BrowserOAuthStorage), replaceState("/") so a reload can't
replay the single-use code, then connect(). An `error=` callback toasts
instead of retrying.
connect() already attaches the OAuth provider to the transport
(inspectorClient.ts), so once tokens land in BrowserOAuthStorage the
outbound request carries the bearer token.
Extracted the pure pieces (constants + isUnauthorizedError) to
src/utils/oauthFlow.ts with unit tests. Verified end-to-end in a real
browser against the MCP SDK demo OAuth server: Connect -> redirect ->
auto-approve -> callback -> Connected, with the access token shown in the
Connection Info modal (#1377).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Pull request overview
Wires the existing OAuth authorization-code primitives into the web client's App.tsx: a 401 on connect now auto-triggers client.authenticate() and a new mount effect handles the /oauth/callback page load to exchange the code and reconnect. Pure helpers (OAUTH_CALLBACK_PATH, OAUTH_PENDING_SERVER_KEY, isUnauthorizedError) are extracted into utils/oauthFlow.ts with unit tests, while the React orchestration stays in App.tsx.
Changes:
- Add
utils/oauthFlow.tswith the callback path constant, the sessionStorage key for the pending server id, and a robustisUnauthorizedErrorpredicate (coverserr.status,err.code, and(401)in the message). - In
App.tsx'sonToggleConnectionconnect-catch: detect 401, persist the initiating server id to sessionStorage, callclient.authenticate()(full-page redirect); toast on auth failure. - Add a mount
useEffectthat, onceservershydrate, parses/oauth/callbackparams, recovers the pending server, runscompleteOAuthFlow(code)thenconnect(), and cleans the URL withreplaceState("/"); toasts onerror=or unmatched server, guarded by a one-shot ref.
Reviewed changes
Copilot reviewed 3 out of 3 changed files in this pull request and generated no comments.
| File | Description |
|---|---|
| clients/web/src/utils/oauthFlow.ts | New shared constants + isUnauthorizedError helper for the App-level OAuth wiring. |
| clients/web/src/utils/oauthFlow.test.ts | Unit tests covering the constants and the various 401-detection branches. |
| clients/web/src/App.tsx | Imports the new helpers, replaces the inline /oauth/callback literal, adds the callback useEffect, and extends the connect-catch with the 401 → authenticate() path. |
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|
@claude review |
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Claude finished @cliffhall's task in 3m 9s —— View job Code ReviewSolid, well-documented wiring. The extraction of pure logic into A few suggestions, mostly nits — none are blockers. 1. Toast message conflates two failure modes —
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… + no-store (#1378) Addresses code-review feedback on the token-injection PR: - Prod `server.ts` SPA deep-link fallback (e.g. `/oauth/callback`) previously served the raw index.html off disk via serveStatic, bypassing injection — so a bookmark/reload at a non-`/` route with empty sessionStorage would 401. Route the SPA fallback through the same `serveIndexHtml` (inject) helper; real static assets (paths with a dot) still serve verbatim. Dev already injected on every HTML serve via Vite `transformIndexHtml`. - `getAuthToken()` now persists the injected `window.__INSPECTOR_API_TOKEN__` to sessionStorage (not just the URL-param branch), priming the backstop for any later navigation that loses the global. - Injected HTML responses now send `Cache-Control: no-store`, so a page carrying a token isn't cached and served stale after a restart regenerates the token. Integration tests added: SPA fallback (`/oauth/callback`) carries the token, `Cache-Control: no-store` on injected HTML, real assets served verbatim, and unknown `/api` routes 404 rather than falling through to the HTML shell. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
… 401 match (#1379) Code-review feedback on the OAuth-wiring PR: - Callback effect: split completeOAuthFlow vs connect() into separate try/catch blocks. A token-exchange failure now reads "OAuth token exchange failed … Please try connecting again." (the single-use code is spent and the URL was cleared, so a reload can't retry); a post-OAuth connect failure reads "Failed to connect" since OAuth actually succeeded and re-clicking Connect reuses the persisted tokens. - isUnauthorizedError: anchor the message fallback on the transport's `failed …(401)` wording instead of a bare `(401)`, so an unrelated `(401)` spliced into an error message can't trip the OAuth flow. Added a test. - Documented that clearing the pending id + URL before the server lookup is intentional (deleted/renamed server mid-flow → require a fresh Connect). Also merges the squash-merged #1382 base from v2/main. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Thanks for the thorough review — addressed the actionable items in b5de744. 1 + 4. Toast conflated OAuth-exchange vs connect failures — Fixed. Split the callback effect into two 2. 3. 5. No tests for the React orchestration — Acknowledged; deferring as a follow-up. Standing up 6. Thanks for the positive callouts on the ref-after-early-returns pattern, the Note: this PR's base is now v2/main (#1382 merged), and these changes are propagated down the rest of the stack (#1385, #1387). |
…p + test fetch default (#1384) Code-review feedback on the OAuth Network-log persistence PR: - Documented the double-save: `FetchRequestLogState`'s `saveSession` listener is the backstop; `BrowserNavigation`'s `beforeNavigate` hook is the primary flush for the redirect case. Notes the listener may lose the navigation race and is harmless when it duplicates (last-writer-wins, identical payload). - Reworded the keepalive comment in `RemoteInspectorClientStorage.saveSession`: the 64KB cap is general (the method is also reachable from the listener with the full session log), so a long session could exceed it and drop silently — acceptable since the persisted log is best-effort, not load-bearing. - Added a regression test that constructs `RemoteInspectorClientStorage` without a `fetchFn`, stubs `globalThis.fetch`, and asserts the default wrapper calls it (locks in the "Illegal invocation" fix, which callers otherwise swallow). Optional items (logger.warn on swallowed save errors; setupClientForServer dep churn) acknowledged on the PR, not changed. Also merges the squash-merged #1383 base from v2/main. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
…#1384) (#1385) * feat(auth): inject MCP_INSPECTOR_API_TOKEN into served index.html (#1378) Reloading the web client at the bare URL (no `?MCP_INSPECTOR_API_TOKEN=…` query string) with empty sessionStorage made every `/api/*` request 401 — the browser had no way to recover the backend's auth token. Embed the token into `index.html` on every page load so the browser no longer depends on the query string surviving navigation: - New shared helper `clients/web/server/inject-auth-token.ts` embeds `<script>window.__INSPECTOR_API_TOKEN__ = "…"</script>` (escaped against `</script>` injection; no-op when auth is dangerously omitted). - Dev: the Vite plugin injects via `transformIndexHtml`. - Prod: the Hono server injects on the `/` route. - `App.tsx` `getAuthToken()` now reads the injected global first, then the query string, then sessionStorage (both fallbacks preserved). - Shared global name lives in `INSPECTOR_API_TOKEN_GLOBAL` (`core/mcp/remote/constants.ts`). Tests: helper unit coverage + an integration test exercising the real prod server's `/` → `/api/*` flow (injected token authenticates; missing token 401s). AGENTS.md documents the token-recovery order. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(auth): wire OAuth authorization-code flow into App.tsx (#1379) OAuth-protected MCP servers could not be connected to from the v2 web client: the core OAuth pipeline exists, but App.tsx never invoked it, so a connect attempt 401'd and surfaced "Remote send failed (401): … Missing Authorization header" as a toast. Wire the two missing entry points (all core primitives already in place): - Auto-trigger on 401: in onToggleConnection's catch, detect an upstream 401 (isUnauthorizedError) and call client.authenticate(), which runs discovery + DCR (backend-proxied) and redirects the page to the auth server via BrowserNavigation. The initiating server id is persisted to sessionStorage first, since the OAuth `state` carries only mode+authId and the full-page redirect wipes React state. - /oauth/callback handler: a mount effect that, once `servers` hydrate, parses the callback params, recovers the pending server, rebuilds its InspectorClient, runs completeOAuthFlow(code) (PKCE verifier + DCR client info survive in BrowserOAuthStorage), replaceState("/") so a reload can't replay the single-use code, then connect(). An `error=` callback toasts instead of retrying. connect() already attaches the OAuth provider to the transport (inspectorClient.ts), so once tokens land in BrowserOAuthStorage the outbound request carries the bearer token. Extracted the pure pieces (constants + isUnauthorizedError) to src/utils/oauthFlow.ts with unit tests. Verified end-to-end in a real browser against the MCP SDK demo OAuth server: Connect -> redirect -> auto-approve -> callback -> Connected, with the access token shown in the Connection Info modal (#1377). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): persist OAuth pre-redirect Network log across the redirect (#1384) After #1379, the Network tab showed only the post-redirect auth HTTP (discovery re-run + POST /token); the pre-redirect discovery and the DCR POST /register that run during authenticate() were lost when the page navigated to the auth server. Root causes: 1. Ordering — BrowserNavigation set `window.location.href` before the client's `saveSession` event fired (OAuthManager calls onBeforeOAuthRedirect *after* auth() already navigated), so the save raced the unload and was dropped. Fix: BrowserNavigation now runs a synchronous `beforeNavigate` hook immediately before assigning location.href; App wires it through createWebEnvironment to flush the active fetch log to RemoteInspectorClient Storage (keyed by the authId parsed from the auth URL) via a keepalive POST that outlives the unload. 2. Illegal invocation — RemoteInspectorClientStorage defaulted to `this.fetchFn = globalThis.fetch` and called `this.fetchFn(...)`, which re-binds `this` and makes native fetch throw "Illegal invocation" (swallowed by the catch). This silently broke *all* session save/load. Fix: default to a wrapper that preserves the global receiver. 3. Restore race — hydrateFetchRequests replaced the list, so a load that resolved after the resuming connect appended live entries would clobber them. Fix: merge restored (older) entries ahead of live ones, dedupe by id. saveSession also now uses keepalive: true. Verified end-to-end against the MCP SDK demo OAuth server: the connected page's Network tab shows the full handshake — pre-redirect discovery + DCR /register plus post-redirect discovery + /token as `auth`, alongside `transport`. Added unit tests for the beforeNavigate ordering and the hydrate merge/dedupe. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): inject token into prod SPA fallback + prime sessionStorage + no-store (#1378) Addresses code-review feedback on the token-injection PR: - Prod `server.ts` SPA deep-link fallback (e.g. `/oauth/callback`) previously served the raw index.html off disk via serveStatic, bypassing injection — so a bookmark/reload at a non-`/` route with empty sessionStorage would 401. Route the SPA fallback through the same `serveIndexHtml` (inject) helper; real static assets (paths with a dot) still serve verbatim. Dev already injected on every HTML serve via Vite `transformIndexHtml`. - `getAuthToken()` now persists the injected `window.__INSPECTOR_API_TOKEN__` to sessionStorage (not just the URL-param branch), priming the backstop for any later navigation that loses the global. - Injected HTML responses now send `Cache-Control: no-store`, so a page carrying a token isn't cached and served stale after a restart regenerates the token. Integration tests added: SPA fallback (`/oauth/callback`) carries the token, `Cache-Control: no-store` on injected HTML, real assets served verbatim, and unknown `/api` routes 404 rather than falling through to the HTML shell. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): address #1383 review — split OAuth/connect toasts, tighten 401 match (#1379) Code-review feedback on the OAuth-wiring PR: - Callback effect: split completeOAuthFlow vs connect() into separate try/catch blocks. A token-exchange failure now reads "OAuth token exchange failed … Please try connecting again." (the single-use code is spent and the URL was cleared, so a reload can't retry); a post-OAuth connect failure reads "Failed to connect" since OAuth actually succeeded and re-clicking Connect reuses the persisted tokens. - isUnauthorizedError: anchor the message fallback on the transport's `failed …(401)` wording instead of a bare `(401)`, so an unrelated `(401)` spliced into an error message can't trip the OAuth flow. Added a test. - Documented that clearing the pending id + URL before the server lookup is intentional (deleted/renamed server mid-flow → require a fresh Connect). Also merges the squash-merged #1382 base from v2/main. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(auth): address #1385 review — clarify double-save + keepalive cap + test fetch default (#1384) Code-review feedback on the OAuth Network-log persistence PR: - Documented the double-save: `FetchRequestLogState`'s `saveSession` listener is the backstop; `BrowserNavigation`'s `beforeNavigate` hook is the primary flush for the redirect case. Notes the listener may lose the navigation race and is harmless when it duplicates (last-writer-wins, identical payload). - Reworded the keepalive comment in `RemoteInspectorClientStorage.saveSession`: the 64KB cap is general (the method is also reachable from the listener with the full session log), so a long session could exceed it and drop silently — acceptable since the persisted log is best-effort, not load-bearing. - Added a regression test that constructs `RemoteInspectorClientStorage` without a `fetchFn`, stubs `globalThis.fetch`, and asserts the default wrapper calls it (locks in the "Illegal invocation" fix, which callers otherwise swallow). Optional items (logger.warn on swallowed save errors; setupClientForServer dep churn) acknowledged on the PR, not changed. Also merges the squash-merged #1383 base from v2/main. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
… toggle (#1386) (#1387) * feat(auth): inject MCP_INSPECTOR_API_TOKEN into served index.html (#1378) Reloading the web client at the bare URL (no `?MCP_INSPECTOR_API_TOKEN=…` query string) with empty sessionStorage made every `/api/*` request 401 — the browser had no way to recover the backend's auth token. Embed the token into `index.html` on every page load so the browser no longer depends on the query string surviving navigation: - New shared helper `clients/web/server/inject-auth-token.ts` embeds `<script>window.__INSPECTOR_API_TOKEN__ = "…"</script>` (escaped against `</script>` injection; no-op when auth is dangerously omitted). - Dev: the Vite plugin injects via `transformIndexHtml`. - Prod: the Hono server injects on the `/` route. - `App.tsx` `getAuthToken()` now reads the injected global first, then the query string, then sessionStorage (both fallbacks preserved). - Shared global name lives in `INSPECTOR_API_TOKEN_GLOBAL` (`core/mcp/remote/constants.ts`). Tests: helper unit coverage + an integration test exercising the real prod server's `/` → `/api/*` flow (injected token authenticates; missing token 401s). AGENTS.md documents the token-recovery order. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(auth): wire OAuth authorization-code flow into App.tsx (#1379) OAuth-protected MCP servers could not be connected to from the v2 web client: the core OAuth pipeline exists, but App.tsx never invoked it, so a connect attempt 401'd and surfaced "Remote send failed (401): … Missing Authorization header" as a toast. Wire the two missing entry points (all core primitives already in place): - Auto-trigger on 401: in onToggleConnection's catch, detect an upstream 401 (isUnauthorizedError) and call client.authenticate(), which runs discovery + DCR (backend-proxied) and redirects the page to the auth server via BrowserNavigation. The initiating server id is persisted to sessionStorage first, since the OAuth `state` carries only mode+authId and the full-page redirect wipes React state. - /oauth/callback handler: a mount effect that, once `servers` hydrate, parses the callback params, recovers the pending server, rebuilds its InspectorClient, runs completeOAuthFlow(code) (PKCE verifier + DCR client info survive in BrowserOAuthStorage), replaceState("/") so a reload can't replay the single-use code, then connect(). An `error=` callback toasts instead of retrying. connect() already attaches the OAuth provider to the transport (inspectorClient.ts), so once tokens land in BrowserOAuthStorage the outbound request carries the bearer token. Extracted the pure pieces (constants + isUnauthorizedError) to src/utils/oauthFlow.ts with unit tests. Verified end-to-end in a real browser against the MCP SDK demo OAuth server: Connect -> redirect -> auto-approve -> callback -> Connected, with the access token shown in the Connection Info modal (#1377). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): persist OAuth pre-redirect Network log across the redirect (#1384) After #1379, the Network tab showed only the post-redirect auth HTTP (discovery re-run + POST /token); the pre-redirect discovery and the DCR POST /register that run during authenticate() were lost when the page navigated to the auth server. Root causes: 1. Ordering — BrowserNavigation set `window.location.href` before the client's `saveSession` event fired (OAuthManager calls onBeforeOAuthRedirect *after* auth() already navigated), so the save raced the unload and was dropped. Fix: BrowserNavigation now runs a synchronous `beforeNavigate` hook immediately before assigning location.href; App wires it through createWebEnvironment to flush the active fetch log to RemoteInspectorClient Storage (keyed by the authId parsed from the auth URL) via a keepalive POST that outlives the unload. 2. Illegal invocation — RemoteInspectorClientStorage defaulted to `this.fetchFn = globalThis.fetch` and called `this.fetchFn(...)`, which re-binds `this` and makes native fetch throw "Illegal invocation" (swallowed by the catch). This silently broke *all* session save/load. Fix: default to a wrapper that preserves the global receiver. 3. Restore race — hydrateFetchRequests replaced the list, so a load that resolved after the resuming connect appended live entries would clobber them. Fix: merge restored (older) entries ahead of live ones, dedupe by id. saveSession also now uses keepalive: true. Verified end-to-end against the MCP SDK demo OAuth server: the connected page's Network tab shows the full handshake — pre-redirect discovery + DCR /register plus post-redirect discovery + /token as `auth`, alongside `transport`. Added unit tests for the beforeNavigate ordering and the hydrate merge/dedupe. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(network): show auth response bodies with masked secrets + reveal toggle (#1386) Auth-category Network entries showed request body/headers/status but never the response body (rendered "(empty)"), because buildEffectiveAuthFetch deliberately skipped capturing it to avoid surfacing access_token / refresh_token. That hid the most useful thing to inspect when debugging OAuth — the token exchange. Capture auth response bodies, but mask sensitive OAuth fields by default behind a click-to-reveal toggle so they aren't exposed at a glance during a screen-share: - inspectorClient: wire updateResponseBody on the auth fetcher. - src/utils/maskSecrets.ts: maskSecretsInBody() masks access_token, refresh_token, id_token, client_secret (case-insensitive, nested) in JSON bodies; reports whether anything was masked. Non-JSON / secret-free bodies pass through untouched. - NetworkEntry BodyPreview: when a body has masked fields, render it masked with a Reveal/Hide toggle (copy honors the shown view). Masking is a UI concern; the raw entry is unchanged so reveal shows the real value. access_token / refresh_token live in the post-redirect /token response, which is never written to the session-restore files (#1384); only pre-redirect bodies (public discovery, DCR /register) persist, so no bearer token hits disk. Verified end-to-end: the /token response shows masked by default (access_token: "••••••••"), Reveal exposes the raw value, and discovery / the public DCR /register response (no secret) render with no toggle. Added util + component unit tests and a story play function. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): inject token into prod SPA fallback + prime sessionStorage + no-store (#1378) Addresses code-review feedback on the token-injection PR: - Prod `server.ts` SPA deep-link fallback (e.g. `/oauth/callback`) previously served the raw index.html off disk via serveStatic, bypassing injection — so a bookmark/reload at a non-`/` route with empty sessionStorage would 401. Route the SPA fallback through the same `serveIndexHtml` (inject) helper; real static assets (paths with a dot) still serve verbatim. Dev already injected on every HTML serve via Vite `transformIndexHtml`. - `getAuthToken()` now persists the injected `window.__INSPECTOR_API_TOKEN__` to sessionStorage (not just the URL-param branch), priming the backstop for any later navigation that loses the global. - Injected HTML responses now send `Cache-Control: no-store`, so a page carrying a token isn't cached and served stale after a restart regenerates the token. Integration tests added: SPA fallback (`/oauth/callback`) carries the token, `Cache-Control: no-store` on injected HTML, real assets served verbatim, and unknown `/api` routes 404 rather than falling through to the HTML shell. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): address #1383 review — split OAuth/connect toasts, tighten 401 match (#1379) Code-review feedback on the OAuth-wiring PR: - Callback effect: split completeOAuthFlow vs connect() into separate try/catch blocks. A token-exchange failure now reads "OAuth token exchange failed … Please try connecting again." (the single-use code is spent and the URL was cleared, so a reload can't retry); a post-OAuth connect failure reads "Failed to connect" since OAuth actually succeeded and re-clicking Connect reuses the persisted tokens. - isUnauthorizedError: anchor the message fallback on the transport's `failed …(401)` wording instead of a bare `(401)`, so an unrelated `(401)` spliced into an error message can't trip the OAuth flow. Added a test. - Documented that clearing the pending id + URL before the server lookup is intentional (deleted/renamed server mid-flow → require a fresh Connect). Also merges the squash-merged #1382 base from v2/main. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(auth): address #1385 review — clarify double-save + keepalive cap + test fetch default (#1384) Code-review feedback on the OAuth Network-log persistence PR: - Documented the double-save: `FetchRequestLogState`'s `saveSession` listener is the backstop; `BrowserNavigation`'s `beforeNavigate` hook is the primary flush for the redirect case. Notes the listener may lose the navigation race and is harmless when it duplicates (last-writer-wins, identical payload). - Reworded the keepalive comment in `RemoteInspectorClientStorage.saveSession`: the 64KB cap is general (the method is also reachable from the listener with the full session log), so a long session could exceed it and drop silently — acceptable since the persisted log is best-effort, not load-bearing. - Added a regression test that constructs `RemoteInspectorClientStorage` without a `fetchFn`, stubs `globalThis.fetch`, and asserts the default wrapper calls it (locks in the "Illegal invocation" fix, which callers otherwise swallow). Optional items (logger.warn on swallowed save errors; setupClientForServer dep churn) acknowledged on the PR, not changed. Also merges the squash-merged #1383 base from v2/main. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(network): address #1387 review — form-encoded masking, cleaner flag, a11y (#1386) Code-review feedback on the auth-response-body masking PR: - Extended masking to form-urlencoded bodies (finding #1): the token *request* is `application/x-www-form-urlencoded` and carries `code` / `code_verifier` / `client_secret` / `refresh_token`. `maskSecretsInBody` now masks those in form bodies too (preserving formatting; placeholder not percent-encoded). `code`/`code_verifier`/`client_assertion` are form-only sensitive keys — deliberately NOT masked in JSON, where `code` is usually an error/status code. - Replaced the double-stringify `hasSecrets` heuristic with an explicit masked-flag propagated out of `maskNode` (finding #2) — robust if the transform ever grows non-identity behavior, and one fewer serialization. - Reset reveal state on body change via `key={body}` remount instead of a setState-in-effect (finding #3; avoids the cascading-render lint rule). - a11y (finding #4): `aria-label` on the Reveal/Hide button and `aria-live` on the hidden/revealed status text. - Security tripwire comment near the `saveSession` listener (finding #6): captured auth bodies are unmasked at source (masking is UI-only), so any new post-token-exchange persistence path must redact first. Tests: form-encoded masking (token + refresh requests), JSON `code` NOT masked, non-object JSON pass-through, default-fetch wrapper. Story play + NetworkEntry tests updated for the new aria-labels and the now-masked form request body. Finding #5 (pretty-print asymmetry) is already handled by ContentViewer's JSON formatting; #4-aria and #6 are the doc/a11y bits. Also merges the squash-merged #1385 base from v2/main. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(network): address #1387 third-pass review — content-type masking, wholesale mask, dedup (#1386) Third-pass code-review feedback on the auth-body masking PR: - maskSecretsInBody now takes the body's content-type (finding #1): `*json*` → JSON masking, form-urlencoded → form masking, any other known type (HTML/plaintext/XML) → no masking; absent/unknown → sniff as before. Removes the implicit "non-JSON ⇒ form" guess for error pages etc. NetworkEntry passes the request/response `content-type` header through to BodyPreview. - Mask any non-empty value under a sensitive key wholesale (finding #2): a non-standard object/array value under e.g. `access_token` is replaced rather than recursed into, so it can't leak. Empty-string still not flagged. - Extracted `isSensitiveKey(set, key)` to dedupe the JSON/form key checks (finding #3). - Reworded `MaskResult.masked` doc to cover the form (non-pretty-printed) case (finding #6). Tests: non-string-value-under-sensitive-key wholesale mask; repeated form param; empty form value not flagged; content-type honored (JSON type skips form masking, text/plain skips masking, explicit form type masks). Finding #5 (story re-hide) skipped per reviewer — unit test already covers re-mask. Finding #4 (form edge cases) added. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(network): address #1387 fourth-pass nits — content-type contract, key, form test (#1386) Fourth-pass review (LGTM) — minor, non-blocking items: - Documented the content-type matching contract on `maskSecretsInBody`: substring match (`*json*` / `*x-www-form-urlencoded*`), and we trust the wire's own label (a mislabeled body renders raw — acceptable for the screen-share threat model) (finding #1). - Key `<BodyPreview>` by content-type + body (not body alone) so a header-only change would also reset the reveal state (finding #3; not reachable today). - Storybook `AuthSuccess`: assert revealed count `>=` reveal-button count to mirror the `hidden >= 2` check, so adding a non-masked body later can't drift the assertion silently (finding #4). - Added a `NetworkEntry` unit test for form-encoded request-body masking (code/code_verifier) — previously exercised only via the Storybook play. Finding #2 (silent decodeURIComponent fallback on malformed keys) acknowledged as a known quirk outside the threat model; no change. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * perf(network): address #1387 fifth-pass — memoize masking, mask DCR mgmt token (#1386) Fifth-pass review (LGTM): - Memoized `maskSecretsInBody` in `BodyPreview` (recommended item #1): a Reveal/Hide click no longer re-parses + re-walks the body; cost is once per mount, and the `key` remount re-runs it on body/content-type change. Guarded so a too-large body is never parsed (the hook runs unconditionally, with the size check inside the memo). - Added `registration_access_token` (RFC 7592 DCR management credential, same bearer class) to the masked key set, and a confidential-client `/register` response fixture test (#5) asserting client_secret + registration_access_token masked, client_id/metadata visible. - Tightened the `isMaskableValue` doc to state the exact contract: non-null, non-empty-string values are masked wholesale (#3). Items #2 (transport parse cost — capped by the memo) and #4 (test-only MASK_PLACEHOLDER export) left as-is per the review. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(network): clarify body-update emits list event only (#1387 sixth pass) (#1386) Sixth-pass review (LGTM, all nits). Added a comment on `onFetchRequestBodyUpdate` noting it re-emits only `fetchRequestsChange`, not the per-entry `fetchRequest` event — list-reading consumers pick up the body on the next render; a future per-entry subscriber would need its own event. Other items left as-is per the review: full-string `BodyPreview` key (#1, micro-perf only if profiled), NaN under a sensitive key (#3, consistent with the mask-non-null-non-empty contract), `&`-only form separator (#4, OAuth never emits `;`). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>



Closes #1379.
Problem
OAuth-protected MCP servers couldn't be connected to from the v2 web client. The full OAuth pipeline already exists in
core/, butApp.tsxnever invoked it — so a connect attempt 401'd and surfaced the toast the reporter saw:Change
All the core primitives (
authenticate(),completeOAuthFlow(),BrowserOAuthStorage,BrowserNavigation, backend-proxied OAuth fetches) were already in place; this wires the two missing entry points inApp.tsx:onToggleConnection's catch,isUnauthorizedError(err)detects an upstream 401 and callsclient.authenticate(), which runs discovery + DCR (proxied through the backend) and redirects the page to the auth server viaBrowserNavigation. The initiating server id is persisted tosessionStoragefirst, because the OAuthstatecarries only{mode}:{authId}and the full-page redirect wipes React state./oauth/callbackhandler — a mount effect that, onceservershydrate, parses the callback params, recovers the pending server, rebuilds itsInspectorClient, runscompleteOAuthFlow(code)(the PKCE verifier + DCR client info survive inBrowserOAuthStorage),replaceState("/")so a reload can't replay the single-use code, thenconnect(). Anerror=callback toasts instead of retrying.connect()already attaches the OAuth provider to the transport, so once tokens land inBrowserOAuthStoragethe outbound request carries the bearer token.The pure pieces (constants +
isUnauthorizedError) are extracted tosrc/utils/oauthFlow.tswith unit tests; the React orchestration stays inApp.tsx.Acceptance criteria
error=callback surfaces a toast instead of silently retrying.Testing
Verified end-to-end in a real browser against the MCP TypeScript SDK demo OAuth server (resource
:3000, auth server:3001, DCR): Connect → redirect → auto-approve →/oauth/callback→ Connected (82ms), with the access token shown in the Connection Info modal and the URL cleaned back to/.npm run validate(1851 unit tests + coverage gate),npm run test:integration(491), andnpm run test:storybook(322) all green.Out of scope (per issue)
Guided OAuth step-through UI, explicit "Sign in"/"Sign out" affordances, DCR corner cases (#571).
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