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nedtwigg merged 1 commit into from
Jul 21, 2026
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docs: fix dangling sentence fragment in SECURITY.md #273

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2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion SECURITY.md
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Expand Up @@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ This repository runs the [tend](https://github.com/max-sixty/tend) agent harness

An attacker who lands a prompt injection in tend's harness can reach three secrets. None of them escalates directly into malicious content on the `main` branch or into any deployment-related secret — those paths stay admin-gated. The boundaries we accept are codified below.

- `TEND_BOT_TOKEN` (worst case): full `repo` + `workflow` write access *as a trusted collaborator*. Direct uses are issue/PR spam, force-pushing or deleting feature branches, and persistent compromise by authoring new workflows (persistent compromise mitigated by [`workflow-audit.yaml`](.github/workflows/workflow-audit.yaml)). Authoring a workflow is also the mechanism by which `CHROMATIC_PROJECT_TOKEN` is reached. and the bot's trusted identity. **It cannot itself merge to `main`, push tags, or reach env-scoped secrets, but the bot's trusted identity can be used to social-engineer an admin toward a `main` merge.**
- `TEND_BOT_TOKEN` (worst case): full `repo` + `workflow` write access *as a trusted collaborator*. Direct uses are issue/PR spam, force-pushing or deleting feature branches, and persistent compromise by authoring new workflows (persistent compromise mitigated by [`workflow-audit.yaml`](.github/workflows/workflow-audit.yaml)). Authoring a workflow is also the mechanism by which `CHROMATIC_PROJECT_TOKEN` is reached. **It cannot itself merge to `main`, push tags, or reach env-scoped secrets, but the bot's trusted identity can be used to social-engineer an admin toward a `main` merge.**
- `CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN`: bounded Anthropic API-credit abuse, capped by the bot account's spend limit.
- `CHROMATIC_PROJECT_TOKEN`: lets the attacker corrupt snapshot testing; mitigated by rotation, and any abuse is visible in Chromatic's own dashboard.

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