SOLR-17767: Add a Java Agent (SIP-24) by janhoy · Pull Request #4471 · apache/solr

janhoy · 2026-05-27T13:44:01Z

Implements SIP-24 — a drop-in replacement for the JVM Security Manager (removed in JDK 24) using a Java agent built on ByteBuddy @Advice interceptors.

Default mode is warn-only. No behaviour changes for existing deployments unless you explicitly opt in to enforce mode.

Disclaimer: All code written by and reviewed by LLMs. Expected to still have some rough edges.

What this adds

A new Gradle subproject solr/agent-sm/ that builds a self-contained fat JAR. The startup scripts auto-detect and load it via -javaagent: if present in solr/server/lib/ext/. Four categories of protection:

Category	Intercepted JDK entry points
File access	`FileSystemProvider` subclasses, `java.nio.file.Files`, `FileChannel` subtypes — read/write/delete/copy/move/create
Network access	`SocketChannel.connect()`, `Socket.connect()`
JVM exit	`System.exit()`, `Runtime.halt()`
Process exec	`ProcessBuilder.start()`, `Runtime.exec()`

Violations are logged as SECURITY VIOLATION [TYPE] target=… caller=… mode=… and counted in /admin/metrics under the node registry as a single labeled counter solr_security_agent_violations_total{type="file"|"network"|"exit"|"exec"} in Prometheus format.

Policy is read from server/etc/agent-security.policy (JDK-style .policy syntax). Variable substitution expands properties (e.g. ${solr.solr.home}, ${solr.port.listen}), with env-var fallback. Operators extend the policy via server/etc/agent-security-extra.policy or SOLR_SECURITY_AGENT_EXTRA_POLICY. Five modules with legitimate outbound network needs (jwt-auth, opentelemetry, s3-repository, gcs-repository, cross-dc-manager) are pre-permitted in the default policy.

NOTE: The interceptors and policy parser/expander are forked and adapted from the OpenSearch agent-sm project (Apache 2.0). Attribution added in NOTICE.txt and package-info.java.

Code review guide

Core loop

SolrAgentEntryPoint.premain() — loads the policy and installs all interceptors. The fat JAR is placed on Boot-Class-Path (SLF4J is intentionally absent, so this is safe) so all classes are visible to the bootstrap classloader and can redefine java.base methods.
FileInterceptor — @Advice.OnMethodEnter is inlined into JDK bytecode at load time, not called normally. The trusted-filesystem exemption short-circuits for non-file: providers (Lucene's in-memory FS, jar/zip/jrt schemes); Unix domain socket cleanup returns early. Paths are normalised via Path.normalize() before the policy check to prevent ..-traversal bypasses.
StackCallerClassChainExtractor — call-chain extraction via StackWalker. Used by SystemExitInterceptor and RuntimeHaltInterceptor to check whether any class in the full stack is an approved exit caller.
PolicyLoader.load() — two-file merge (default + optional operator extension), variable substitution via PolicyPropertyExpander, codeBase-scoped grants. Parsing is strict: any non-comment top-level token that is not a grant block causes an IllegalStateException (fail-fast). An absent or comment-only operator extension file is silently accepted; the default policy must contain at least one grant.
ViolationMetricsReporter — LongAdder counters only; incremented from premain via incrementFile/Network/Exit/Exec(). No OTel dependency. After startup, AgentViolationMetrics (in solr:core) reads the counts reflectively and wires them into the metrics registry.
AgentViolationMetrics (org.apache.solr.security, solr:core) — registers a single OTel observable counter solr.security.agent.violations with label type. Uses AttributeKey/Attributes/ObservableLongMeasurement natively (no reflection for OTel types); only the four plain-long counter reads cross the bootstrap/app classloader boundary via reflection.
SecurityViolationLogger / AgentViolationBridge — two-phase output. During early startup violations go to System.err; once CoreContainer calls AgentViolationBridge.wire() after Log4j2 is up, a Consumer<String> is set on SecurityViolationLogger.reporter and violations route to solr.log at WARN. Reflection is used because the two modules have no compile-time dependency on each other.

Wiring into Solr

bin/solr / bin/solr.cmd — detect solr-agent-sm-*.jar in lib/ext/ and prepend -javaagent: to SOLR_OPTS. SOLR_SECURITY_AGENT_SKIP=true disables this.
solr/server/build.gradle — libExt dependency on :solr:agent-sm places the agent JAR in server/lib/ext/ in the packaged distribution.
CoreContainer.java — calls AgentViolationMetrics.register(metricManager, NODE_REGISTRY) and AgentViolationBridge.wire().

Tests

Unit tests (solr/agent-sm/src/test/) run with the JVM Security Manager active, which causes 3 tests to be skipped. Notable classes:

SolrAgentIntegrationTest — end-to-end in enforce mode with counter verification
SymlinkEscapeTest — symlink escape prevention
PolicyLoaderOperatorExtensionTest — operator extension merge, DEFAULT/OPERATOR source tagging, fail-fast on garbage policy content
SystemExitInterceptorTest, SocketChannelInterceptorTest, ProcessExecInterceptorTest

BATS integration tests (solr/packaging/test/test_security_agent.bats) — 7 tests covering start-script logic and agent behaviour via small standalone violation programs:

Test 1 — warn mode active by default; metrics registered (solr_security_agent_violations_total{type="file"} etc.)
Test 2 — SOLR_SECURITY_AGENT_SKIP=true suppresses agent entirely
Test 3 — SOLR_SECURITY_AGENT_MODE and extra-policy env vars forwarded correctly
Tests 4–7 — enforce mode blocks file read, System.exit, outbound connect, and process exec with SecurityException

Testing IRL

# Unit tests (62 tests, 3 skipped under SecurityManager)
./gradlew :solr:agent-sm:test

# BATS integration tests
./gradlew :solr:packaging:integrationTests --tests test_security_agent.bats

# Start Solr in warn mode (default) and check violation counters
bin/solr start
curl http://localhost:8983/solr/admin/metrics
# Look for: solr_security_agent_violations_total{type="file"}, ...{type="network"}, etc.

# Opt in to enforce mode
SOLR_SECURITY_AGENT_MODE=enforce bin/solr start

Things worth eyeballing manually:

server/etc/agent-security.policy — did we miss any legitimate Solr access patterns? Check intra-cluster wildcards (*:${solr.port.listen}, *:${solr.zk.port}).
Run tests with -Ptests.useSecurityManager=false to exercise the 3 normally-skipped tests.

What this does NOT do

No enforce mode in the broader Solr test suite yet (warn only; enforce flip is a follow-up per SIP-24).
Does not remove existing SolrPaths.assertPathAllowed() call sites — that method is now @Deprecated but left in place.

https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/SOLR-17767

…tion - solr/server/build.gradle: add agent fat JAR to libExt (transitive=false) so it lands in server/lib/ext/ of the packaged distribution used by BATS - CoreContainer.java: fix Class.forName to use CoreContainer's classloader instead of null (bootstrap); the agent JAR is in lib/ext/ loaded by Jetty's server classloader, not the bootstrap classloader - ViolationMetricsReporter: replace Codahale registerGauge (non-existent in this OTel-based branch) with observableLongCounter reflective call; remove buildGauge/Proxy; metrics appear in Prometheus format as security_agent_violations_{file,network,exit,exec}_total - test_security_agent.bats: add --user-managed to avoid embedded ZooKeeper crash; update metrics assertion to Prometheus format name; fix metrics endpoint URL (no group/prefix params); all 3 tests now pass

Fix sysprop names Add BATS tests to verify actual invocation

…it/network/exec; remove redundant VirtualThreadCompatibilityTest - Add testPrograms sourceSet in agent-sm compiling FileViolation, ExitViolation, NetworkViolation, ExecViolation into a standalone JAR (no Solr/ByteBuddy deps). - Wire AGENT_TEST_PROGRAMS_JAR into integrationTests task; BATS test #4 drops the inline javac+heredoc in favour of the pre-compiled JAR. - Add BATS tests #5 (System.exit), #6 (SocketChannel.connect to RFC 5737 TEST-NET-1), #7 (ProcessBuilder exec) — all verify SecurityException in enforce mode. - Delete VirtualThreadCompatibilityTest: StackWalker virtual-thread compatibility is guaranteed by JDK spec and already exercised by other unit tests. - Fix rat-sources.gradle: exclude src/test-programs/** for :solr:agent-sm.

…atus != 123 in BATS System.exit(0) is unreachable after a successful exit, making refute_output vacuous and masking a broken agent (exit code 0 would trigger assert_failure for the wrong reason). Using exit code 123 as a sentinel lets the BATS test explicitly verify that the interceptor fired (SecurityException in output, status != 123).

# Conflicts: # solr/core/gradle.lockfile # solr/solrj-zookeeper/gradle.lockfile # solr/test-framework/gradle.lockfile

…n-walk exec, codeBase matching Part A — stale class names: - dev-docs/security-agent.adoc: SolrSecurityPolicy → AgentPolicy, StackInspector → StackCallerClassChainExtractor - build.gradle comment: SolrSecurityPolicy, FileAccessInterceptor → AgentPolicy, FileInterceptor B1 — FileInterceptor "read" was a no-op; add explicit policy check for Files.read() path B2 — Remove tautological `args instanceof Object` guard (always true) B4 — SocketChannelInterceptor: implement codeBase matching via StackWalker instead of silently skipping codeBase-scoped entries; add isCallerFromCodeBase() helper + tests B5 — ProcessExecInterceptor: walk full chain (like SystemExitInterceptor) instead of checking only direct caller; add AgentPolicy.isChainThatCanExec() + tests B6 — Remove 0.0.0.0 from trustedHosts (unspecified bind address, not loopback) B7 — PermittedPath: use java.io.File.separator instead of hardcoded "/" and "\\" B8 — SolrAgentEntryPoint: .or(isAbstract()) → .and(not(isAbstract())) in file method matcher B9 — FileInterceptor: remove redundant second getCallerClass() call inside delete branch B10 — AgentPolicy.resetForTesting(): add comment explaining deliberate unsynchronized write B11 — Rename bootOtel → bootAgent in SolrAgentEntryPoint B12 — Fix typo: testApprovedCallerAnywherInChain → testApprovedCallerAnywhereInChain B13 — FileInterceptor: move resolveRealPath() Javadoc above the correct method; note why toRealPath() must not be called from the advice (circular interception) B14 — ViolationMetricsReporter.findMethod(): match by param type simple names, not just count B15 — SecurityViolationLogger: clarify stack-trace comment; deduplicate debug block

…onventions All Solr metrics should start with "solr.*". Rename: security.agent.violations.{file,network,exit,exec} → solr.security.agent.violations.{file,network,exit,exec} In Prometheus format: solr_security_agent_violations_*_total. Update BATS test assertion, ref-guide, and Javadoc accordingly.

…Programs; use NIO FileSystems.getSeparator() in PermittedPath - testProgramsAnnotationProcessor config was pulling in error-prone deps not in the dependency lock file; disable annotation processing for trivial test programs. - PermittedPath used java.io.File (forbidden API); switch to FileSystems.getDefault().getSeparator() per Solr's NIO-only policy.

…Interceptor Add `import java.net.URL;`, replace `java.net.URL loc` with `URL loc`, and replace `java.net.InetSocketAddress` parameter type with `InetSocketAddress` since the type is already imported. Fixes CI error-prone -Werror failures.

…yPoint Add imports for SocketChannel, Socket and use simple names for System, Runtime, ProcessBuilder — all were already in java.lang or now imported. Fixes CI error-prone -Werror failures.

…erceptor

… agent-sm - build.gradle: disable error-prone for compileTestProgramsJava (no errorprone JAR on testProgramsAnnotationProcessor config) - SymlinkEscapeTest, SocketChannelInterceptorTest, SolrAgentIntegrationTest: add missing imports and remove FQ type references All 59 tests pass with -Pvalidation.errorprone=true.

The Prometheus output includes OTel scope labels alongside the type label (e.g. otel_scope_name="org.apache.solr",type="file"), so asserting on 'solr_security_agent_violations_total{type="file"' fails. Assert on the base metric name only since the presence of the counter is what matters.

Throwing SecurityException unconditionally for an unrecognised args[1] type bypassed the violation counter and structured log, and would break legitimate file operations in warn mode. Unknown types are now treated conservatively as mutating (write check applied).

The Javadoc claimed String#matches (full regex) with patterns like 'org\.apache\.solr\..*'. The actual implementation in ApprovedCallSite.matches() uses equals/startsWith semantics: '*' is wildcard, 'pkg.*' matches the package and sub-packages, anything else is an exact class-name match.

On Windows, CodeSource.getLocation().getPath() may return backslash separators while the codeBase string from the policy file uses forward slashes. Normalize both strings to forward slashes before the startsWith/equals comparison so the recursive codeBase check works correctly on all platforms.

The interceptor was using toAbsolutePath().normalize() which does not follow symbolic links, allowing a symlink inside a permitted directory that points outside it to bypass the policy check. Replace with resolveRealPath() which calls toRealPath() to resolve the real on-disk path before the policy check. A ThreadLocal guard (IN_SYMLINK_RESOLVE) prevents infinite recursion in case toRealPath() itself triggers an intercepted file operation. On IOException (path does not yet exist), falls back to toAbsolutePath().normalize(). The same fix is applied to the copy/move target-path resolution.

Copilot

Pull request overview

Copilot reviewed 58 out of 62 changed files in this pull request and generated 4 comments.

@origin

ByteBuddy binds @origin Method on every intercepted connect() call even though the parameter was never read. Removing it eliminates a reflective Method lookup on each outbound connection attempt.

When a policy grant block included a codeBase attribute, e.g.: grant codeBase "file:/opt/solr/modules/foo/-" { permission java.lang.RuntimePermission "exitVM"; }; PolicyLoader was storing the codeBase URL string as the classNamePattern in ApprovedCallSite. ApprovedCallSite.matches() then compared it against fully-qualified class names, which can never match a "file:/.../..." URL string, making all codeBase-scoped exit/exec grants silently no-ops. Fix: ApprovedCallSite now carries a separate codeBase field. When codeBase is set, matchesCodeBase(Class<?>) is used (delegating to the same SocketChannelInterceptor.isCallerFromCodeBase logic used for network grants). AgentPolicy.isChainThatCanExit/Exec dispatch to the right matcher depending on which field is set. The simple isExitApproved/isExecApproved(String) helpers skip codeBase entries since they have no Class<?> to inspect. Also correct the ApprovedCallSite Javadoc (previously claimed SolrCLI and SolrDispatchFilter are default-approved exit callers, which was never true), and add an explanatory comment in agent-security.policy documenting why exitVM grants are intentionally absent from the default policy.

Copilot

Pull request overview

Copilot reviewed 58 out of 62 changed files in this pull request and generated no new comments.

… verbose.

actions.contains(action) does substring matching, so a malformed policy string like "readwrite" (missing comma) would incorrectly match both "read" and "write". Split the stored actions string into a Set at construction time and use Set.contains() for exact token matching.

Policy files use "[::1]:8983" bracket notation for IPv6 but InetSocketAddress.getHostString() returns "::1" without brackets. lastIndexOf(':') found the colon after ']' correctly, but the extracted entryHost retained the brackets and never equaled the actual host string. Parse bracket-notation IPv6 entries separately: strip the '[' and ']' before passing to matchesHost so "::1" matches "[::1]:8983". Add two tests covering the bracket notation with an exact port and a port range.

janhoy · 2026-05-29T20:30:39Z

Docker and BATS tests currently fail. I believe it is due to resolving of symlinks on linux and translating paths with toRealPath() gives a different absolute path than what is predefined in the policy file. It works locally on a Mac. So maybe we need to apply the same toRealPath() and Path.normalize() steps to the paths provided in the policy through ${solr.install.dir} etc before comparison? Currently investigating...

Two bugs that cause Solr to fail to start when the Old Java SecurityManager is active (SOLR_SECURITY_MANAGER_ENABLED=true, the default for Java < 24): 1. resolveRealPath() only caught IOException, not SecurityException. On JDK 21 and earlier, Path.toRealPath() calls sm.checkRead() on the original path internally; if that check fails (e.g. when the Old SM policy does not cover the accessed path), a SecurityException is thrown. Because the advice signature declares 'throws Exception' but the catch clause was IOException-only, the SecurityException propagated through the ByteBuddy advice and aborted the intercepted file operation, preventing Solr from starting. Fix: catch IOException | SecurityException and fall back to toAbsolutePath().normalize() in both cases. 2. Policy paths from agent-security.policy were stored verbatim after variable substitution without resolving symlinks. At runtime, resolveRealPath() returns the real (symlink-resolved) form, which would not match a symlinked policy path. Fix: normalize each FilePermission base path via toRealPath() (same fallback logic as the runtime check) when building the policy, so both sides of the comparison use the canonical form. Also updates the stale comment in agent-security.policy that said "FileInterceptor uses toAbsolutePath(), not toRealPath()".

Gradle's incremental-build state tracking reads the @OutputDirectory before running the task. Docker containers run as uid 8983 (the solr user); any files they create (e.g. logs/) are unreadable by the Gradle runner process, causing an AccessDeniedException before the test even starts. Adding doNotTrackState() bypasses the output-directory inspection so the task always runs regardless of prior leftover artifacts.

ByteBuddy inlines @Advice.OnMethodEnter bytecode into JDK methods (e.g. java.nio.file.Files). Any static helper called from inlined advice must be public; package-private access causes IllegalAccessError at runtime because the inlined call-site executes in the context of the JDK class, not FileInterceptor. This was causing Solr startup failures on Linux with JDK 21 when the Old SecurityManager policy loaded lazily via Files.newByteChannel.

dsmiley

Overall I'm very impressed with the thoroughness here. This is very complete and well thought-out.

It's not clear we'll want to bother running our normal Java tests with the securityh agent -- I don't think it's worth the hassle and maintenance of a parallel test policy.

Disclaimer: I didn't look at the bats tests. I skimmed the agent code, mostly.

dsmiley · 2026-05-30T04:31:51Z

IMO org.apache.solr.servlet.CoreContainerProvider#init is a more suitable place. CoreContainer can be used for embedding and lighter-weight tests that shouldn't have to deal with initialization of this nature.

dsmiley · 2026-05-30T04:49:51Z

+|solr.security.agent.extra.policy||`${server.dir}/etc/agent-security-extra.policy`|Path to the operator extension policy file for the Solr security agent. Overrides the default location. An absent file is silently skipped.
+
+|solr.security.agent.mode||`warn`|Enforcement mode for the Solr security agent: `warn` (log violations, continue) or `enforce` (log violations, block the operation with `SecurityException`).
+
+|solr.security.agent.skip||`false`|If set to `true`, omits the `-javaagent:` flag from the JVM command line, disabling all Solr security agent controls. Intended for temporary troubleshooting only.


I assume these can't be set via env vars because these are pre-EnvUtils?

dsmiley · 2026-05-30T04:56:48Z

+ * optionally all descendants) for the set of operations encoded in the {@code actions} string
+ * ({@code "read"}, {@code "write"}, {@code "delete"}, or any comma-separated combination).
+ */
+public final class PermittedPath {


not a record?

dsmiley · 2026-05-30T04:57:30Z

+ * codeBase matching: the calling class must have been loaded from a location matching the JDK
+ * policy {@code codeBase} URL ({@code file:/path/-} recursive, {@code file:/path/to.jar} exact).
+ */
+public final class ApprovedCallSite {


not a record?

Please audit these classes for record suitability. Tip: IntelliJ will do the conversion for you and may even suggest it.

dsmiley · 2026-05-30T05:13:22Z

+ * classes are visible to the bootstrap classloader; SLF4J is excluded from the fat JAR to avoid
+ * poisoning the binding before Log4j2 initializes.


I keep seeing this repeated; I don't think you need to say anything and not here. Just maybe the build.gradle loudly in the dependency list "// DO NOT DEPEND ON SLF4J OR OTHER LOGGING JARS" is fine to prevent future fools from doing so.

Inlined ByteBuddy advice calls enforceNetworkAccess() from within sun.nio.ch.SocketChannelImpl (java.base). Package-private access causes IllegalAccessError at runtime; public is required.

Any static helper called from @Advice.OnMethodEnter must be public; the advice is inlined into JDK methods (java.base) and package-private access causes IllegalAccessError at runtime.

janhoy added 8 commits May 26, 2026 20:20

SOLR-17767: Add a Java Agent

389bb68

Delete speckit folder

f25d06f

Align interceptors with reference impl from Opensearch

ae9fb97

Fix sysprop names Add BATS tests to verify actual invocation

Fix exit bats test

8297df0

Merge branch 'main' into 15868-java-agent

3d716f1

# Conflicts: # solr/core/gradle.lockfile # solr/solrj-zookeeper/gradle.lockfile # solr/test-framework/gradle.lockfile

github-actions Bot added documentation Improvements or additions to documentation dependencies Dependency upgrades test-framework jetty-server client:solrj tool:build start-scripts tests cat:security labels May 27, 2026

Lockfiles

69499ca

github-actions Bot removed the test-framework label May 27, 2026

janhoy added 11 commits May 27, 2026 15:52

Fix changelog

0afc2ee

Other fixes

8a906ba

Remove untrue statement in solr-properties.adoc

067ca3b

Fix error-prone UnnecessarilyFullyQualified warnings in SolrAgentEntr…

f63ab08

…yPoint Add imports for SocketChannel, Socket and use simple names for System, Runtime, ProcessBuilder — all were already in java.lang or now imported. Fixes CI error-prone -Werror failures.

Fix precommit and wrong docs

8fa1276

Fix error-prone UnnecessarilyFullyQualified warning in ProcessExecInt…

cfe0060

…erceptor

janhoy added 5 commits May 28, 2026 12:56

janhoy requested a review from Copilot May 28, 2026 11:06

Copilot started reviewing on behalf of janhoy May 28, 2026 11:07 View session

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janhoy added 2 commits May 28, 2026 13:26

Drop unused @origin Method param from SocketChannelInterceptor.intercept

1db48be

ByteBuddy binds @origin Method on every intercepted connect() call even though the parameter was never read. Removing it eliminates a reflective Method lookup on each outbound connection attempt.

janhoy requested a review from Copilot May 28, 2026 11:43

Copilot started reviewing on behalf of janhoy May 28, 2026 11:43 View session

Copilot AI reviewed May 28, 2026

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janhoy added 2 commits May 28, 2026 13:46

Improve agents instruction around code comments, which tend to be too…

2a92315

… verbose.

janhoy marked this pull request as ready for review May 28, 2026 11:53

janhoy requested review from dsmiley, gus-asf and malliaridis May 28, 2026 11:57

janhoy added 5 commits May 29, 2026 23:40

Trim comments and Javadoc in agent-sm: remove obvious and redundant text

a5cad1a

precommit

1f7630c

dsmiley reviewed May 30, 2026

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janhoy added 3 commits May 30, 2026 11:40

Fix SocketChannelInterceptor: make enforceNetworkAccess public

8a3b76f

Inlined ByteBuddy advice calls enforceNetworkAccess() from within sun.nio.ch.SocketChannelImpl (java.base). Package-private access causes IllegalAccessError at runtime; public is required.

Document ByteBuddy advice visibility rule in package-info.java

0d51afd

Any static helper called from @Advice.OnMethodEnter must be public; the advice is inlined into JDK methods (java.base) and package-private access causes IllegalAccessError at runtime.

Tidy

f28ba3f

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SOLR-17767: Add a Java Agent (SIP-24)#4471

SOLR-17767: Add a Java Agent (SIP-24)#4471
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janhoy:15868-java-agent

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		* poisoning the binding before Log4j2 initializes.

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Wiring into Solr

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janhoy commented May 27, 2026 •

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