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Signed-off-by: Kevin Wang <wy721@qq.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wang <wy721@qq.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wang <wy721@qq.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wang <wy721@qq.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wang <wy721@qq.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wang <wy721@qq.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wang <wy721@qq.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wang <wy721@qq.com>
…tion Signed-off-by: Kevin Wang <wy721@qq.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wang <wy721@qq.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wang <wy721@qq.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wang <wy721@qq.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wang <wy721@qq.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wang <wy721@qq.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wang <wy721@qq.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wang <wy721@qq.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wang <wy721@qq.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wang <wy721@qq.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wang <wy721@qq.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wang <wy721@qq.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wang <wy721@qq.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wang <wy721@qq.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wang <wy721@qq.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wang <wy721@qq.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wang <wy721@qq.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wang <wy721@qq.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wang <wy721@qq.com>
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wang <wy721@qq.com>
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KMS root keys are retained by epoch and selected from explicit authorization results.
authorizeKms/authorizeAppnow carry a required operation, represented by a shared serde-derived Rust enum and hashedbytes32on chain. Known operations share the existing policy; unknown or wrong-scope operations fail closed. Self-authorization caching is operation-specific.Preserve
GetTempCaCert, its response, temporary CA persistence/renewal and the legacy handover field so KMS nodes can be upgraded before old OS images. Tokenless onboarding retains CA-issued client certificates for legacy sources. The recipient authorizes the source throughauthorizeKms(export_kms_keys)on the key-carrying connection; bootstrap uses its own operation before epoch-zero registration. Existing bootAuth routes remain for old KMS binaries.Application certificate authorization uses Rust
GetAppCertand JSON/on-chain operation nameget_app_cert; the existingSignCertKMS RPC is unchanged.Prior layer validation: 73 KMS, 8 Rust auth, 36 DstackKms contract tests and 116 adapter tests passed; strict production Rust Clippy passed. Local Linux x86_64, Rust 1.92.0, Solc 0.8.24 / Forge 1.8.4, synthetic certificates/policies and loopback HTTP. Full-stack validation and dependency limitations are recorded in #1533; no live TEE onboarding was exercised.