Improve defenses against malicious bitcoin RPC endpoint - #3343
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When using Bitcoin Core RPC, we now validate that the returned transaction matches the request. This is part of a defense-in-depth strategy in case our batching client messes up the order of RPC responses.
We previously only relied on the order of requests to match responses that we receive from bitcoind, but there is no guarantee that the order will be preserved. In practice it seems to be the case, but we should be resilient if that changes. We now use unique request IDs and match the corresponding response using this ID instead of relying on position only.
We verify that the amount contributed by our Bitcoin Core wallet matches what we requested. A malicious Bitcoin Core may underfund or overfund, which in both cases is undesirable behavior.
sstone
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Aug 11, 2026
t-bast
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Aug 12, 2026
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This PR contains three independent commits that improve security in case the bitcoin RPC endpoint is malicious. Note that this isn't foolproof: a fully compromised Bitcoin Core client is hard to protect against, and eclair isn't yet fully secure if that happens. But we're taking steps towards that goal with incremental improvements.
Reported by AI scanning from @Rob1Ham 🙏