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{
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"schema_version": "1.4.0",
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"id": "GHSA-pv58-549p-qh99",
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"modified": "2026-02-18T00:33:35Z",
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"published": "2026-02-18T00:33:35Z",
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"aliases": [
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"CVE-2026-26327"
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],
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"summary": "OpenClaw allows unauthenticated discovery TXT records could steer routing and TLS pinning",
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"details": "## Summary\n\nDiscovery beacons (Bonjour/mDNS and DNS-SD) include TXT records such as `lanHost`, `tailnetDns`, `gatewayPort`, and `gatewayTlsSha256`. TXT records are unauthenticated.\n\nPrior to the fix, some clients treated TXT values as authoritative routing/pinning inputs:\n\n- iOS and macOS: used TXT-provided host hints (`lanHost`/`tailnetDns`) and ports (`gatewayPort`) to build the connection URL.\n- iOS and Android: allowed the discovery-provided TLS fingerprint (`gatewayTlsSha256`) to override a previously stored TLS pin.\n\nOn a shared/untrusted LAN, an attacker could advertise a rogue `_openclaw-gw._tcp` service. This could cause a client to connect to an attacker-controlled endpoint and/or accept an attacker certificate, potentially exfiltrating Gateway credentials (`auth.token` / `auth.password`) during connection.\n\n## Distribution / Exposure\n\nThe iOS and Android apps are currently alpha/not broadly shipped (no public App Store / Play Store release). Practical impact is primarily limited to developers/testers running those builds, plus any other shipped clients relying on discovery on a shared/untrusted LAN.\n\nCVSS can still be used for the technical (base) severity of the bug; limited distribution primarily affects environmental risk.\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Affected: `<= 2026.2.13` (latest published on npm as of 2026-02-14)\n- Patched: planned for `>= 2026.2.14` (not yet published at time of writing)\n\n## Fix\n\n- Clients now prefer the resolved service endpoint (SRV + A/AAAA) over TXT-provided routing hints.\n- Discovery-provided fingerprints no longer override stored TLS pins.\n- iOS/Android: first-time TLS pins require explicit user confirmation (fingerprint shown; no silent TOFU).\n- iOS/Android: discovery-based direct connects are TLS-only.\n- Android: hostname verification is no longer globally disabled (only bypassed when pinning).\n\n## Fix Commit(s)\n\n- d583782ee322a6faa1fe87ae52455e0d349de586\n\n## Credits\n\nThanks @simecek for reporting.",
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"severity": [
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{
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"type": "CVSS_V4",
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"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N"
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}
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],
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"affected": [
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{
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"package": {
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"ecosystem": "npm",
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"name": "openclaw"
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},
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"ranges": [
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{
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"type": "ECOSYSTEM",
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"events": [
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{
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"introduced": "0"
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},
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{
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"fixed": "2026.2.14"
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}
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]
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}
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]
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}
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],
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"references": [
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{
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"type": "WEB",
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"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-pv58-549p-qh99"
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},
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{
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"type": "WEB",
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"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/d583782ee322a6faa1fe87ae52455e0d349de586"
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},
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{
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"type": "PACKAGE",
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"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
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},
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{
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"type": "WEB",
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"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/releases/tag/v2026.2.14"
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}
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],
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"database_specific": {
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"cwe_ids": [
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"CWE-345"
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],
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"severity": "HIGH",
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"github_reviewed": true,
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"github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-18T00:33:35Z",
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"nvd_published_at": null
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}
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}

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