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{
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"schema_version": "1.4.0",
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"id": "GHSA-h4hq-rgvh-wh27",
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"modified": "2026-03-04T20:13:44Z",
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"published": "2026-03-04T20:13:44Z",
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"aliases": [
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"CVE-2026-27803"
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],
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"summary": "Vaultwarden's Collection Management Operations Allowed Without `manage` Verification for Manager Role",
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"details": "## Summary\n\nTesting confirmed that even when a Manager has `manage=false` for a given collection, they can still perform the following management operations as long as they have access to the collection:\n\n* `PUT /api/organizations/<org_id>/collections/<col_id>` succeeds (HTTP 200)\n* `PUT /api/organizations/<org_id>/collections/<col_id>/users` succeeds (HTTP 200)\n* `DELETE /api/organizations/<org_id>/collections/<col_id>` succeeds (HTTP 200)\n\n\n\n## Description\n\n* The Manager guard checks only whether the user **can access the collection**, not whether they have `manage` privileges. This check is directly applied to management endpoints.\nsrc/auth.rs:816\n ```rust\n\n if !Collection::can_access_collection(&headers.membership, &col_id, &conn).await {\n err_handler!(\"The current user isn't a manager for this collection\")\n }\n ```\n\n* The `can_access_collection` function does **not** evaluate the `manage` flag.\n src/db/models/collection.rs:140\n\n ```rust\n\n pub async fn can_access_collection(member: &Membership, col_id: &CollectionId, conn: &DbConn) -> bool {\n member.has_status(MembershipStatus::Confirmed)\n && (member.has_full_access()\n || CollectionUser::has_access_to_collection_by_user(col_id, &member.user_uuid, conn).await\n || ...\n ```\n\n* A separate management-permission check exists and includes `manage` validation, but it is **not used** during authorization for the affected endpoints.\n src/db/models/collection.rs:516\n\n ```rust\n\n pub async fn is_manageable_by_user(&self, user_uuid: &UserId, conn: &DbConn) -> bool {\n let Some(member) = Membership::find_confirmed_by_user_and_org(user_uuid, &self.org_uuid, conn).await else {\n return false;\n };\n if member.has_full_access() {\n return true;\n }\n ...\n ```\n\n* The actual update and deletion endpoints only accept `ManagerHeaders` and do not perform additional `manage` checks.\n src/api/core/organizations.rs:608\n\n```rust\n async fn put_organization_collection_update(..., headers: ManagerHeaders, ...)\n```\n\n src/api/core/organizations.rs:890\n\n```rust\n async fn put_collection_users(..., headers: ManagerHeaders, ...)\n```\n \n\nsrc/api/core/organizations.rs:747\n\n```rust\n async fn delete_organization_collection(..., headers: ManagerHeaders, ...)\n ```\n\n\n\n## Preconditions\n\n* The attacker is a **Manager** within the target organization.\n* The attacker has access to the target collection (`assigned=true`).\n* The attacker’s permission for that collection is `manage=false`.\n* A valid API access token has been obtained.\n\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n\n1. Confirm that the attacker’s current permissions for the target collection include `manage=false`.\n<img width=\"2015\" height=\"636\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/58ddc733-e37c-4766-a980-b1ea1918ceb4\" />\n\n2. As a control test, verify that update operations fail for collections the attacker cannot access.\n<img width=\"2021\" height=\"852\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/d8699442-2dfc-4d73-8940-ec10f4a175f0\" />\n\n3. Confirm that update operations succeed for the target collection where `manage=false`.\n<img width=\"2013\" height=\"690\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/33d9845d-d18e-456c-a58c-e780911347a9\" />\n\n4. Use `PUT /collections/{col_id}/users` to set `manage=true`, confirming that the attacker can escalate their own privileges.\n<img width=\"2018\" height=\"488\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/da8c5246-cf2a-46c2-9a25-e99d907f852d\" />\n\n5. Verify that deletion of the collection succeeds despite the Manager lacking management rights.\n<img width=\"2018\" height=\"487\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a97c8fb2-4f97-4c2a-a90b-9d95dbde84fd\" />\n\n\n\n## Required Minimum Privileges\n\n* Organization Manager role (Owner/Admin privileges are not required)\n* Works even with `access_all=false`\n* Only access rights to the target collection are required (`manage` privilege is not required)\n\n\n\n## Attack Scenario\n\nA restricted Manager (intended for read/use-only access) directly invokes the API to update collection settings, elevate their own privileges to `manage=true`, and even delete the collection.\n\nThis allows the user to bypass operational access restrictions and effectively gain administrator-equivalent control over the collection.\n\n\n\n## Potential Impact\n\n* **Confidentiality:** Expansion of access scope through unauthorized privilege escalation and configuration changes.\n* **Integrity:** Unauthorized modification of collection settings and assignments; potential disabling of access controls.\n* **Availability:** Deletion of collections may disrupt business operations.",
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"severity": [
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{
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"type": "CVSS_V3",
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"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L"
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}
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],
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"affected": [
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{
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"package": {
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"ecosystem": "crates.io",
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"name": "vaultwarden"
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},
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"ranges": [
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{
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"type": "ECOSYSTEM",
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"events": [
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{
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"introduced": "0"
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},
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{
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"fixed": "1.35.4"
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}
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]
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}
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],
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"database_specific": {
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"last_known_affected_version_range": "<= 1.35.3"
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}
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}
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],
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"references": [
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{
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"type": "WEB",
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"url": "https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-h4hq-rgvh-wh27"
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},
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{
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"type": "PACKAGE",
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"url": "https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden"
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}
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],
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"database_specific": {
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"cwe_ids": [
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"CWE-269",
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"CWE-285",
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"CWE-863"
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],
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"severity": "HIGH",
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"github_reviewed": true,
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"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-04T20:13:44Z",
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"nvd_published_at": null
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}
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}

advisories/unreviewed/2026/03/GHSA-vpq2-c234-7xj6/GHSA-vpq2-c234-7xj6.json renamed to advisories/github-reviewed/2026/03/GHSA-vpq2-c234-7xj6/GHSA-vpq2-c234-7xj6.json

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{
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"schema_version": "1.4.0",
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"id": "GHSA-vpq2-c234-7xj6",
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"modified": "2026-03-03T06:31:14Z",
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"modified": "2026-03-04T20:15:03Z",
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"published": "2026-03-03T06:31:14Z",
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"aliases": [
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"CVE-2026-3449"
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],
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"summary": "@tootallnate/once vulnerable to Incorrect Control Flow Scoping",
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"details": "Versions of the package @tootallnate/once before 3.0.1 are vulnerable to Incorrect Control Flow Scoping in promise resolving when AbortSignal option is used. The Promise remains in a permanently pending state after the signal is aborted, causing any await or .then() usage to hang indefinitely. This can cause a control-flow leak that can lead to stalled requests, blocked workers, or degraded application availability.",
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"severity": [
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{
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},
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{
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"type": "CVSS_V4",
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"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X"
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"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P"
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}
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],
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"affected": [
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{
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"package": {
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"ecosystem": "npm",
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"name": "@tootallnate/once"
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},
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"ranges": [
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{
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"type": "ECOSYSTEM",
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"events": [
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{
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"introduced": "0"
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},
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{
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"fixed": "3.0.1"
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}
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]
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}
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]
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}
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],
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"affected": [],
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"references": [
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{
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"type": "ADVISORY",
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"type": "WEB",
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"url": "https://github.com/TooTallNate/once/commit/b9f43cc5259bee2952d91ad3cdbd201a82df448a"
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},
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{
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"type": "PACKAGE",
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"url": "https://github.com/TooTallNate/once"
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},
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{
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"type": "WEB",
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"url": "https://security.snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JS-TOOTALLNATEONCE-15250612"
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"cwe_ids": [
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"CWE-705"
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],
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"severity": "MODERATE",
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"github_reviewed": false,
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"github_reviewed_at": null,
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"severity": "LOW",
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"github_reviewed": true,
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"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-04T20:15:03Z",
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"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-03T05:17:25Z"
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}
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}
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{
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"schema_version": "1.4.0",
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"id": "GHSA-w9f8-m526-h7fh",
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"modified": "2026-03-04T20:14:06Z",
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"published": "2026-03-04T20:14:06Z",
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"aliases": [
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"CVE-2026-27898"
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],
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"summary": "Vaultwarden has Unauthorized Access via Partial Update API on Another User’s Cipher",
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"details": "## Summary\n\nIn the test environment, it was confirmed that an authenticated regular user can specify another user’s `cipher_id` and call:\n\n```\nPUT /api/ciphers/{id}/partial\n```\n\nEven though the standard retrieval API correctly denies access to that cipher, the partial update endpoint returns **200 OK** and exposes `cipherDetails` (including `name`, `notes`, `data`, `secureNote`, etc.).\n\n\n\n## Description\n\n`put_cipher_partial` retrieves the target Cipher but does **not perform ownership or access control checks** before returning `to_json`.\nAuthorization checks present in the normal update API are missing here.\nsrc/api/core/ciphers.rs:717\n\n```rust\nlet Some(cipher) = Cipher::find_by_uuid(&cipher_id, &conn).await else {\n err!(\"Cipher doesn't exist\")\n};\n\nif let Some(ref folder_id) = data.folder_id {\n if Folder::find_by_uuid_and_user(folder_id, &headers.user.uuid, &conn).await.is_none() {\n err!(\"Invalid folder\", \"Folder does not exist or belongs to another user\");\n }\n}\n\n// Move cipher\ncipher.move_to_folder(data.folder_id.clone(), &headers.user.uuid, &conn).await?;\n\n// Update favorite\ncipher.set_favorite(Some(data.favorite), &headers.user.uuid, &conn).await?;\n\nOk(Json(cipher.to_json(&headers.host, &headers.user.uuid, None, CipherSyncType::User, &conn).await?))\n```\n\nBy comparison, the standard update API includes an explicit authorization check:\nsrc/api/core/ciphers.rs:688\n\n```rust\nif !cipher.is_write_accessible_to_user(&headers.user.uuid, &conn).await {\n err!(\"Cipher is not write accessible\")\n}\n```\n\nThe `to_json` method does not abort processing when access restrictions are not met; instead, it proceeds to construct and return a detailed response.\nsrc/db/models/cipher.rs:175\n\n```rust\nlet (read_only, hide_passwords, _) = if sync_type == CipherSyncType::User {\n match self.get_access_restrictions(user_uuid, cipher_sync_data, conn).await {\n Some((ro, hp, mn)) => (ro, hp, mn),\n None => {\n error!(\"Cipher ownership assertion failure\");\n (true, true, false)\n }\n }\n} else {\n (false, false, false)\n};\n```\nsrc/db/models/cipher.rs:335\n\n```rust\nlet mut json_object = json!({\n \"object\": \"cipherDetails\",\n \"id\": self.uuid,\n \"type\": self.atype,\n ...\n \"name\": self.name,\n \"notes\": self.notes,\n \"fields\": fields_json,\n \"data\": data_json,\n ...\n});\n```\n\n\n## Preconditions\n\n* The attacker possesses a valid regular-user JWT (Bearer token).\n* The attacker knows the target (victim) `cipher_id`.\n\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n\n1. Prepare the attacker JWT and victim `cipher_id` (preconditions).\n2. Baseline check: confirm that standard retrieval is denied.\n<img width=\"2014\" height=\"855\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/32b12cc9-3672-4a88-afd0-ef7715474662\" />\n\n\n3. Execute the vulnerable API. Confirm that **200 OK** is returned and that `cipherDetails` includes fields such as `id`, `name`, `notes`, `secureNote`, etc.\n<img width=\"2018\" height=\"1113\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/341b330c-8d55-4f06-a622-0d7da28f62fd\" />\n\n\n## Potential Impact\n\n* Unauthorized disclosure of other users’ cipher information (confidentiality breach).\n* Creation of unauthorized associations within the attacker’s user context (e.g., `favorite` or folder operations).\n* The response from `/api/ciphers/<cipher_id>/partial` includes `attachments[].url`.\n\nIn filesystem (FS) deployments, this returns a tokenized endpoint such as:\n\n```\n/attachments/<cipher>/<file>?token=...\n```\n\nIn object storage deployments, it returns a short-lived pre-signed URL.\n\nAs a result, an attacker can use these URLs to directly download attachment data that they are not authorized to access.\n\nThis can lead to disclosure of sensitive information stored in the Vault, including personal data and authentication credentials. Such exposure may further result in account compromise, lateral movement, and other secondary impacts.",
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"severity": [
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{
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"type": "CVSS_V3",
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"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N"
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}
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],
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"affected": [
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{
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"package": {
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"ecosystem": "crates.io",
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"name": "vaultwarden"
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},
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"ranges": [
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{
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"type": "ECOSYSTEM",
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"events": [
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{
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"introduced": "0"
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},
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{
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"fixed": "1.35.4"
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}
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]
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}
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],
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"database_specific": {
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"last_known_affected_version_range": "<= 1.35.3"
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}
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}
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],
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"references": [
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{
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"type": "WEB",
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"url": "https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/GHSA-w9f8-m526-h7fh"
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},
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{
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"type": "PACKAGE",
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"url": "https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden"
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}
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],
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"database_specific": {
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"cwe_ids": [
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"CWE-639"
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],
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"severity": "MODERATE",
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"github_reviewed": true,
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"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-04T20:14:06Z",
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"nvd_published_at": null
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}
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}

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