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GHSA-x288-3778-4hhx GHSA-xh43-g2fq-wjrj
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‎advisories/github-reviewed/2026/02/GHSA-x288-3778-4hhx/GHSA-x288-3778-4hhx.json‎

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{
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"schema_version": "1.4.0",
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"id": "GHSA-x288-3778-4hhx",
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"modified": "2026-02-25T22:42:36Z",
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"published": "2026-02-25T22:42:36Z",
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"aliases": [
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"CVE-2026-27739"
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],
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"summary": "Angular SSR is vulnerable to SSRF and Header Injection via request handling pipeline",
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"details": "A [Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Security/Attacks/SSRF) vulnerability has been identified in the Angular SSR request handling pipeline. The vulnerability exists because Angular’s internal URL reconstruction logic directly trusts and consumes user-controlled HTTP headers specifically the Host and `X-Forwarded-*` family to determine the application's base origin without any validation of the destination domain.\n\nSpecifically, the framework didn't have checks for the following:\n- **Host Domain**: The `Host` and `X-Forwarded-Host` headers were not checked to belong to a trusted origin. This allows an attacker to redefine the \"base\" of the application to an arbitrary external domain.\n- **Path & Character Sanitization**: The `X-Forwarded-Host` header was not checked for path segments or special characters, allowing manipulation of the base path for all resolved relative URLs.\n- **Port Validation**: The `X-Forwarded-Port` header was not verified as numeric, leading to malformed URI construction or injection attacks.\n\n\nThis vulnerability manifests in two primary ways:\n\n- **Implicit Relative URL Resolution**: Angular's `HttpClient` resolves relative URLs against this unvalidated and potentially malformed base origin. An attacker can \"steer\" these requests to an external server or internal service.\n- **Explicit Manual Construction**: Developers injecting the `REQUEST` object to manually construct URLs (for fetch or third-party SDKs) directly inherit these unsanitized values. By accessing the `Host` / `X-Forwarded-*` headers, the application logic may perform requests to attacker-controlled destinations or malformed endpoints.\n\n### Impact\n\nWhen successfully exploited, this vulnerability allows for arbitrary internal request steering. This can lead to:\n- **Credential Exfiltration**: Stealing sensitive `Authorization` headers or session cookies by redirecting them to an attacker's server.\n- **Internal Network Probing**: Accessing and transmitting data from internal services, databases, or cloud metadata endpoints (e.g., `169.254.169.254`) not exposed to the public internet.\n- Confidentiality Breach: Accessing sensitive information processed within the application's server-side context.\n\n### Attack Preconditions\n\n- The victim application must use Angular SSR (Server-Side Rendering).\n- The application must perform `HttpClient` requests using relative URLs OR manually construct URLs using the unvalidated `Host` / `X-Forwarded-*` headers using the `REQUEST` object.\n- **Direct Header Access**: The application server is reachable by an attacker who can influence these headers without strict validation from a front-facing proxy.\n- **Lack of Upstream Validation**: The infrastructure (Cloud, CDN, or Load Balancer) does not sanitize or validate incoming headers.\n\n### Patches\n\n- 21.2.0-rc.1\n- 21.1.5\n- 20.3.17\n- 19.2.21\n\n\n### Workarounds\n- **Use Absolute URLs:** Avoid using `req.headers` for URL construction. Instead, use trusted variables for your base API paths.\n- **Implement Strict Header Validation (Middleware)**: If you cannot upgrade immediately, implement a middleware in your `server.ts` to enforce numeric ports and validated hostnames.\n\n```ts\nconst ALLOWED_HOSTS = new Set(['your-domain.com']);\n\napp.use((req, res, next) => {\n const hostHeader = (req.headers['x-forwarded-host'] ?? req.headers['host'])?.toString();\n const portHeader = req.headers['x-forwarded-port']?.toString();\n\n if (hostHeader) {\n const hostname = hostHeader.split(':')[0];\n // Reject if hostname contains path separators or is not in allowlist\n if (/^[a-z0-9.:-]+$/i.test(hostname) || \n (!ALLOWED_HOSTS.has(hostname) && hostname !== 'localhost')) {\n return res.status(400).send('Invalid Hostname');\n }\n }\n\n // Ensure port is strictly numeric if provided\n if (portHeader && !/^\\d+$/.test(portHeader)) {\n return res.status(400).send('Invalid Port');\n }\n\n next();\n});\n```\n\n### References\n\n- [Fix](https://github.com/angular/angular-cli/pull/32516)\n- [Docs](https://angular.dev/best-practices/security#preventing-server-side-request-forgery-ssrf)",
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"severity": [
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{
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"type": "CVSS_V4",
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"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:H/SI:L/SA:N"
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}
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],
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"affected": [
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{
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"package": {
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"ecosystem": "npm",
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"name": "@angular/ssr"
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},
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"ranges": [
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{
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"type": "ECOSYSTEM",
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"events": [
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{
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"introduced": "21.2.0-next.0"
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},
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{
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"fixed": "21.2.0-rc.1"
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}
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]
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}
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],
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"database_specific": {
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"last_known_affected_version_range": "< 21.2.0-rc.0"
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}
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},
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{
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"package": {
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"ecosystem": "npm",
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"name": "@angular/ssr"
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},
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"ranges": [
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{
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"type": "ECOSYSTEM",
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"events": [
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{
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"introduced": "21.0.0-next.0"
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},
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{
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"fixed": "21.1.5"
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}
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]
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}
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]
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},
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{
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"package": {
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"ecosystem": "npm",
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"name": "@angular/ssr"
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},
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"ranges": [
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{
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"type": "ECOSYSTEM",
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"events": [
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{
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"introduced": "20.0.0-next.0"
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},
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{
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"fixed": "20.3.17"
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}
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]
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}
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]
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},
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{
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"package": {
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"ecosystem": "npm",
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"name": "@angular/ssr"
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},
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"ranges": [
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{
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"type": "ECOSYSTEM",
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"events": [
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{
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"introduced": "0"
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},
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{
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"fixed": "19.2.21"
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}
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]
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}
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]
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},
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{
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"package": {
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"ecosystem": "npm",
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"name": "@nguniversal/common"
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},
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"ranges": [
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{
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"type": "ECOSYSTEM",
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"events": [
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{
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"introduced": "0"
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},
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{
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"last_affected": "16.2.0"
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}
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]
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}
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]
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},
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{
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"package": {
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"ecosystem": "npm",
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"name": "@nguniversal/express-engine"
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},
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"ranges": [
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{
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"type": "ECOSYSTEM",
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"events": [
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{
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"introduced": "0"
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},
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{
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"last_affected": "16.2.0"
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}
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]
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}
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]
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}
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],
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"references": [
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{
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"type": "WEB",
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"url": "https://github.com/angular/angular-cli/security/advisories/GHSA-x288-3778-4hhx"
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},
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{
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"type": "ADVISORY",
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"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27739"
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},
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{
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"type": "WEB",
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"url": "https://github.com/angular/angular-cli/pull/32516"
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},
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{
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"type": "WEB",
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"url": "https://angular.dev/best-practices/security#preventing-server-side-request-forgery-ssrf"
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},
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{
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"type": "WEB",
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"url": "https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Security/Attacks/SSRF"
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},
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{
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"type": "PACKAGE",
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"url": "https://github.com/angular/angular-cli"
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}
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],
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"database_specific": {
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"cwe_ids": [
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"CWE-918"
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],
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"severity": "CRITICAL",
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"github_reviewed": true,
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"github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-25T22:42:36Z",
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"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-25T18:23:40Z"
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}
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}

‎advisories/github-reviewed/2026/02/GHSA-xh43-g2fq-wjrj/GHSA-xh43-g2fq-wjrj.json‎

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{
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"schema_version": "1.4.0",
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"id": "GHSA-xh43-g2fq-wjrj",
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"modified": "2026-02-25T22:41:57Z",
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"published": "2026-02-25T22:41:57Z",
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"aliases": [
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"CVE-2026-27738"
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],
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"summary": "Angular SSR has an Open Redirect via X-Forwarded-Prefix",
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"details": "An Open Redirect vulnerability exists in the internal URL processing logic in Angular SSR. The logic normalizes URL segments by stripping leading slashes; however, it only removes a single leading slash.\n\nWhen an Angular SSR application is deployed behind a proxy that passes the `X-Forwarded-Prefix` header, an attacker can provide a value starting with three slashes (e.g., `///evil.com`).\n\n1. The application processes a redirect (e.g., from a router `redirectTo` or i18n locale switch).\n2. Angular receives `///evil.com` as the prefix.\n3. It strips one slash, leaving `//evil.com`.\n4. The resulting string is used in the `Location` header.\n5. Modern browsers interpret `//` as a protocol-relative URL, redirecting the user from `https://your-app.com` to `https://evil.com`.\n\n\n### Impact\nThis vulnerability allows attackers to conduct large-scale phishing and SEO hijacking:\n- **Scale:** A single request can poison a high-traffic route, impacting all users until the cache expires.\n- **SEO Poisoning:** Search engine crawlers may follow and index these malicious redirects, causing the legitimate site to be delisted or associated with malicious domains.\n- **Trust:** Because the initial URL belongs to the trusted domain, users and security tools are less likely to flag the redirect as malicious.\n\n### Attack Preconditions\n\n- The application must use Angular SSR.\n- The application must have routes that perform internal redirects.\n- The infrastructure (Reverse Proxy/CDN) must pass the `X-Forwarded-Prefix` header to the SSR process without sanitization.\n- The cache must not vary on the `X-Forwarded-Prefix` header.\n\n### Patches\n- 21.2.0-rc.1\n- 21.1.5\n- 20.3.17\n- 19.2.21\n\n### Workarounds\nUntil the patch is applied, developers should sanitize the `X-Forwarded-Prefix` header in their`server.ts` before the Angular engine processes the request:\n\n```ts\napp.use((req, res, next) => {\n const prefix = req.headers['x-forwarded-prefix']?.trim();\n if (prefix) {\n // Sanitize by removing all leading slashes\n req.headers['x-forwarded-prefix'] = prefix.replace(/^[/\\\\]+/, '/');\n }\n next();\n});\n\n```\n\n### Resources\n- [Report](https://github.com/angular/angular-cli/issues/32501)\n- [Fix](https://github.com/angular/angular-cli/pull/32521)",
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"severity": [
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{
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"type": "CVSS_V4",
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"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N"
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}
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],
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"affected": [
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{
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"package": {
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"ecosystem": "npm",
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"name": "@angular/ssr"
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},
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"ranges": [
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{
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"type": "ECOSYSTEM",
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"events": [
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{
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"introduced": "21.2.0-next.0"
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},
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{
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"fixed": "21.2.0-rc.1"
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}
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]
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}
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],
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"database_specific": {
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"last_known_affected_version_range": "< 21.2.0-rc.0"
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}
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},
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{
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"package": {
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"ecosystem": "npm",
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"name": "@angular/ssr"
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},
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"ranges": [
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{
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"type": "ECOSYSTEM",
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"events": [
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{
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"introduced": "21.0.0-next.0"
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},
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{
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"fixed": "21.1.5"
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}
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]
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}
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]
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},
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{
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"package": {
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"ecosystem": "npm",
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"name": "@angular/ssr"
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},
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"ranges": [
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{
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"type": "ECOSYSTEM",
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"events": [
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{
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"introduced": "20.0.0-next.0"
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},
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{
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"fixed": "20.3.17"
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}
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]
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}
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]
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},
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{
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"package": {
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"ecosystem": "npm",
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"name": "@angular/ssr"
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},
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"ranges": [
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{
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"type": "ECOSYSTEM",
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"events": [
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{
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"introduced": "19.0.0-next.0"
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},
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{
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"fixed": "19.2.21"
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}
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]
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}
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]
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}
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],
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"references": [
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{
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"type": "WEB",
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"url": "https://github.com/angular/angular-cli/security/advisories/GHSA-xh43-g2fq-wjrj"
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},
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{
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"type": "ADVISORY",
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"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27738"
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},
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{
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"type": "WEB",
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"url": "https://github.com/angular/angular-cli/issues/32501"
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},
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{
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"type": "WEB",
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"url": "https://github.com/angular/angular-cli/pull/32521"
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},
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{
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"type": "WEB",
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"url": "https://github.com/angular/angular-cli/commit/f086eccc36d10cf01c426e35864bc32e1e292323"
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},
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{
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"type": "PACKAGE",
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"url": "https://github.com/angular/angular-cli"
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}
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],
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"database_specific": {
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"cwe_ids": [
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"CWE-601"
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],
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"severity": "MODERATE",
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"github_reviewed": true,
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"github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-25T22:41:57Z",
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"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-25T17:25:40Z"
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}
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}

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