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GHSA-22qq-3xwm-r5x4
GHSA-f93w-pcj3-rggc
GHSA-hj7x-879w-vrp7
GHSA-xq2h-p299-vjwv

Author: advisory-database[bot]

advisories/github-reviewed/2025/02/GHSA-22qq-3xwm-r5x4/GHSA-22qq-3xwm-r5x4.json

@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
 {
   "schema_version": "1.4.0",
   "id": "GHSA-22qq-3xwm-r5x4",
-  "modified": "2026-03-06T23:04:18Z",
+  "modified": "2026-03-09T20:46:44Z",
   "published": "2025-02-03T15:55:28Z",
   "aliases": [
     "CVE-2025-24371"
   ],
   "summary": "CometBFT allows a malicious peer to make node stuck in blocksync",
-  "details": "Name: ASA-2025-001: Malicious peer can disrupt node's ability to sync via blocksync\nComponent: CometBFT\n[OUTDATED] Criticality: Medium (Considerable Impact; Possible Likelihood per [ACMv1.2](https://github.com/interchainio/security/blob/main/resources/CLASSIFICATION_MATRIX.md))\n**Update of Criticality on 2026-03-06**: We've made a mistake and over-rated the criticality of this bug in our initial triage. We have calibrated our vulnerability rating internally and updated the criticality of this bug to be Informational (Negligible Impact, Possible Likelihood)\nAffected versions: <= v0.38.16, v1.0.0\nAffected users: Validators, Full nodes\n\n### Impact\n\nA malicious peer may be able to interfere with a node's ability to sync blocks with peers via the blocksync mechanism. \n\nIn the `blocksync` protocol peers send their `base` and `latest` heights when they connect to a new node (`A`), which is syncing to the tip of a network. `base` acts as a lower ground and informs `A` that the peer only has blocks starting from height `base`. `latest` height informs `A` about the latest block in a network. Normally, nodes would only report increasing heights:\n\n```\nB: {base: 100, latest: 1000}\nB: {base: 100, latest: 1001}\nB: {base: 100, latest: 1002}\n...\n```\n\nIf `B` fails to provide the latest block, `B` is removed and the `latest` height (target height) is recalculated based on other nodes `latest` heights.\n\nThe existing code hovewer doesn't check for the case where `B` first reports `latest` height `X` and immediately after height `Y`, where `X > Y`. For example:\n\n```\nB: {base: 100, latest: 2000}\nB: {base: 100, latest: 1001}\nB: {base: 100, latest: 1002}\n...\n```\n\n`A` will be trying to catch up to 2000 indefinitely. Even if `B` disconnects, the `latest` height (target height) won't be recalculated because `A` \"doesn't know where 2000\" came from per see.\n\n#### Impact Qualification\n\nThis condition requires the introduction of malicious code in the full node first reporting a non-existing `latest` height, then reporting lower `latest` height and nodes which are syncing using `blocksync` protocol.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe new CometBFT releases [v1.0.1](https://github.com/cometbft/cometbft/releases/tag/v1.0.1) and [v0.38.17](https://github.com/cometbft/cometbft/releases/tag/v0.38.17) fix this issue.\n\nUnreleased code in the main is patched as well.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nWhen the operator notices `blocksync` is stuck, they can identify the peer from which that message with \"invalid\" height was received. This may require increasing the logging level of the `blocksync` module. This peer can then be subsequently banned at the p2p layer as a temporary mitigation.\n\n### References\n\nIf you have questions about Interchain security efforts, please reach out to our official communication channel at [security@interchain.io](mailto:security@interchain.io).  For more information about the Interchain Foundation’s engagement with Amulet, and to sign up for security notification emails, please see https://github.com/interchainio/security.  \n\nA Github Security Advisory for this issue is available in the CometBFT [repository](https://github.com/cometbft/cometbft/security/advisories/GHSA-22qq-3xwm-r5x4). For more information about CometBFT, see https://docs.cometbft.com/.",
+  "details": "Name: ASA-2025-001: Malicious peer can disrupt node's ability to sync via blocksync\nComponent: CometBFT\n[OUTDATED] Criticality: Medium (Considerable Impact; Possible Likelihood per [ACMv1.2](https://github.com/interchainio/security/blob/main/resources/CLASSIFICATION_MATRIX.md))\n**Update of Criticality on 2026-03-06**: We've made a mistake and over-rated the criticality of this bug in our initial triage. We have calibrated our vulnerability rating internally and updated the criticality of this bug to be Informational (Negligible Impact, Possible Likelihood)\nAffected versions: <= v0.38.16, v1.0.0\nAffected users: Validators, Full nodes\n\n### Impact\n\nA malicious peer may be able to interfere with a node's ability to sync blocks with peers via the blocksync mechanism. \n\nIn the `blocksync` protocol peers send their `base` and `latest` heights when they connect to a new node (`A`), which is syncing to the tip of a network. `base` acts as a lower ground and informs `A` that the peer only has blocks starting from height `base`. `latest` height informs `A` about the latest block in a network. Normally, nodes would only report increasing heights:\n\n```\nB: {base: 100, latest: 1000}\nB: {base: 100, latest: 1001}\nB: {base: 100, latest: 1002}\n...\n```\n\nIf `B` fails to provide the latest block, `B` is removed and the `latest` height (target height) is recalculated based on other nodes `latest` heights.\n\nThe existing code hovewer doesn't check for the case where `B` first reports `latest` height `X` and immediately after height `Y`, where `X > Y`. For example:\n\n```\nB: {base: 100, latest: 2000}\nB: {base: 100, latest: 1001}\nB: {base: 100, latest: 1002}\n...\n```\n\n`A` will be trying to catch up to 2000 indefinitely. Even if `B` disconnects, the `latest` height (target height) won't be recalculated because `A` \"doesn't know where 2000\" came from per see.\n\n#### Impact Qualification\n\nThis condition requires the introduction of malicious code in the full node first reporting a non-existing `latest` height, then reporting lower `latest` height and nodes which are syncing using `blocksync` protocol.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe new CometBFT releases [v1.0.1](https://github.com/cometbft/cometbft/releases/tag/v1.0.1) and [v0.38.17](https://github.com/cometbft/cometbft/releases/tag/v0.38.17) fix this issue.\n\nUnreleased code in the main is patched as well.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nWhen the operator notices `blocksync` is stuck, they can identify the peer from which that message with \"invalid\" height was received. This may require increasing the logging level of the `blocksync` module. This peer can then be subsequently banned at the p2p layer as a temporary mitigation.\n\n### References\n\nIf you have questions about Interchain security efforts, please reach out to our official communication channel at [security@interchain.io](mailto:security@interchain.io).  For more information about the Interchain Foundation’s engagement with Amulet, and to sign up for security notification emails, please see https://github.com/interchainio/security.  \n\nA Github Security Advisory for this issue is available in the CometBFT [repository](https://github.com/cometbft/cometbft/security/advisories/GHSA-22qq-3xwm-r5x4). For more information about CometBFT, see https://docs.cometbft.com/.\n\nEDIT:\n\nPlease notice that this has been updated to be `informational` severity.  This can be avoided by ensuring that one is not connected to a malicious peer during blocksync.",
   "severity": [
     {
       "type": "CVSS_V4",

advisories/github-reviewed/2026/03/GHSA-f93w-pcj3-rggc/GHSA-f93w-pcj3-rggc.json

@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
 {
   "schema_version": "1.4.0",
   "id": "GHSA-f93w-pcj3-rggc",
-  "modified": "2026-03-05T20:57:49Z",
+  "modified": "2026-03-09T20:46:06Z",
   "published": "2026-03-05T20:57:49Z",
   "aliases": [
     "CVE-2026-2836"
   ],
   "summary": "Pingora vulnerable to cache poisoning via insecure-by-default cache key",
-  "details": "### Impact\nPingora versions prior to 0.8.0 generated cache keys using only the URI path, excluding critical factors such as the host header. This allows an attacker to poison the cache and serve cross-origin responses to users.\n\nThis vulnerability affects users of Pingora's alpha proxy caching feature who relied on the default CacheKey implementation. An attacker could exploit this for cross-tenant data leakage in multi-tenant deployments, or serve malicious content to legitimate users by poisoning shared cache entries.\n\nNote: Cloudflare customers and Cloudflare's CDN infrastructure were not affected by this vulnerability, as Cloudflare's default cache key implementation uses multiple factors to prevent cache key poisoning and never made use of the previously provided default.\n\n### Patches\nWe strongly suggest users should upgrade to Pingora v.0.8.0 or higher, which removes the default CacheKey implementation.\n\n### Workarounds\nDo not rely on the provided CacheKey default, and at minimum use the host / :authority and the upstream peer TLS scheme as part of building the CacheKey, as well as other factors that may apply to the deployment e.g. HTTP method. \n\n### Resources\nSee https://cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-2836. An upcoming Cloudflare blog post will also contain more details.\n\n### Credits\nDisclosed responsibly by Rajat Raghav (@xclow3n) through the Cloudflare [Bug Bounty Program](https://www.cloudflare.com/disclosure/).",
+  "details": "### Impact\nPingora versions prior to 0.8.0 generated cache keys using only the URI path, excluding critical factors such as the host header. This allows an attacker to poison the cache and serve cross-origin responses to users.\n\nThis vulnerability affects users of Pingora's alpha proxy caching feature who relied on the default CacheKey implementation. An attacker could exploit this for cross-tenant data leakage in multi-tenant deployments, or serve malicious content to legitimate users by poisoning shared cache entries.\n\nNote: Cloudflare customers and Cloudflare's CDN infrastructure were not affected by this vulnerability, as Cloudflare's default cache key implementation uses multiple factors to prevent cache key poisoning and never made use of the previously provided default.\n\n### Patches\nWe strongly suggest users should upgrade to Pingora v.0.8.0 or higher, which removes the default CacheKey implementation.\n\n### Workarounds\nDo not rely on the provided CacheKey default, and at minimum use the host / :authority and the upstream peer TLS scheme as part of building the CacheKey, as well as other factors that may apply to the deployment e.g. HTTP method. \n\n### References\nSee [CVE-2026-2836](https://cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-2836) and the [Cloudflare blog post](https://blog.cloudflare.com/pingora-oss-smuggling-vulnerabilities/) for more details.\n\n### Credits\nDisclosed responsibly by Rajat Raghav (@xclow3n) through the Cloudflare [Bug Bounty Program](https://www.cloudflare.com/disclosure/).",
   "severity": [
     {
       "type": "CVSS_V4",

advisories/github-reviewed/2026/03/GHSA-hj7x-879w-vrp7/GHSA-hj7x-879w-vrp7.json

@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
 {
   "schema_version": "1.4.0",
   "id": "GHSA-hj7x-879w-vrp7",
-  "modified": "2026-03-05T20:56:21Z",
+  "modified": "2026-03-09T20:45:57Z",
   "published": "2026-03-05T20:56:20Z",
   "aliases": [
     "CVE-2026-2835"
   ],
   "summary": "Pingora has HTTP Request Smuggling via HTTP/1.0 and Transfer-Encoding Misparsing",
-  "details": "### Impact\nPingora versions prior to 0.8.0 improperly allowed HTTP/1.0 request bodies to be close-delimited and incorrectly handled multiple Transfer-Encoding values. This allows an attacker to desync Pingora's request framing from backend servers and smuggle requests to the backend.\n\nThis vulnerability primarily affects standalone Pingora deployments in front of certain backends that accept HTTP/1.0 requests. An attacker could exploit this to bypass proxy-level ACL controls and WAF logic, poison caches and upstream connections, or perform cross-user attacks by hijacking sessions.\n\nNote: Cloudflare customers and Cloudflare's CDN infrastructure were not affected by this vulnerability, as its ingress proxy layers rejected ambiguous framing such as invalid Content-Length values and internally forwarded non-ambiguous message length framing headers.\n\n### Patches\nPingora users should upgrade to Pingora v0.8.0 or higher that fixes this issue by correctly parsing message length headers per RFC 9112 and strictly adhering to more RFC guidelines, including that HTTP request bodies are never close-delimited (commits 7f7166d62fa916b9f11b2eb8f9e3c4999e8b9023, 40c3c1e9a43a86b38adeab8da7a2f6eba68b83ad, and 87e2e2fb37edf9be33e3b1d04726293ae6bf2052).\n\n### Workarounds\nAs a workaround, users can reject certain requests with an error in the request filter logic in order to stop processing bytes on the connection and disable downstream connection reuse. The user should reject any non-HTTP/1.1 request, or a request that has invalid Content-Length, multiple Transfer-Encoding headers, or Transfer-Encoding header that is not an exact “chunked” string match.\n\n### Resources\nSee https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-2835. An upcoming Cloudflare blog will also contain more details.\n\n### Credits\nDisclosed responsibly by Rajat Raghav (@xclow3n) through the Cloudflare [Bug Bounty Program](https://www.cloudflare.com/disclosure/).",
+  "details": "### Impact\nPingora versions prior to 0.8.0 improperly allowed HTTP/1.0 request bodies to be close-delimited and incorrectly handled multiple Transfer-Encoding values. This allows an attacker to desync Pingora's request framing from backend servers and smuggle requests to the backend.\n\nThis vulnerability primarily affects standalone Pingora deployments in front of certain backends that accept HTTP/1.0 requests. An attacker could exploit this to bypass proxy-level ACL controls and WAF logic, poison caches and upstream connections, or perform cross-user attacks by hijacking sessions.\n\nNote: Cloudflare customers and Cloudflare's CDN infrastructure were not affected by this vulnerability, as its ingress proxy layers rejected ambiguous framing such as invalid Content-Length values and internally forwarded non-ambiguous message length framing headers.\n\n### Patches\nPingora users should upgrade to Pingora v0.8.0 or higher that fixes this issue by correctly parsing message length headers per RFC 9112 and strictly adhering to more RFC guidelines, including that HTTP request bodies are never close-delimited (commits 7f7166d62fa916b9f11b2eb8f9e3c4999e8b9023, 40c3c1e9a43a86b38adeab8da7a2f6eba68b83ad, and 87e2e2fb37edf9be33e3b1d04726293ae6bf2052).\n\n### Workarounds\nAs a workaround, users can reject certain requests with an error in the request filter logic in order to stop processing bytes on the connection and disable downstream connection reuse. The user should reject any non-HTTP/1.1 request, or a request that has invalid Content-Length, multiple Transfer-Encoding headers, or Transfer-Encoding header that is not an exact “chunked” string match.\n\n### References\nSee [CVE-2026-2835](https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-2835) and the [Cloudflare blog post](https://blog.cloudflare.com/pingora-oss-smuggling-vulnerabilities/) for more details.\n\n### Credits\nDisclosed responsibly by Rajat Raghav (@xclow3n) through the Cloudflare [Bug Bounty Program](https://www.cloudflare.com/disclosure/).",
   "severity": [
     {
       "type": "CVSS_V4",

advisories/github-reviewed/2026/03/GHSA-xq2h-p299-vjwv/GHSA-xq2h-p299-vjwv.json

@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
 {
   "schema_version": "1.4.0",
   "id": "GHSA-xq2h-p299-vjwv",
-  "modified": "2026-03-05T20:55:29Z",
+  "modified": "2026-03-09T20:45:48Z",
   "published": "2026-03-05T20:55:29Z",
   "aliases": [
     "CVE-2026-2833"
   ],
   "summary": "Pingora vulnerable to HTTP Request Smuggling via Premature Upgrade",
-  "details": "### Impact\nPingora versions prior to 0.8.0 would immediately forward bytes following a request with an Upgrade header to the backend, without waiting for a 101 Switching Protocols response. This allows an attacker to smuggle requests to the backend and bypass proxy-level security controls.\n\nThis vulnerability primarily affects standalone Pingora deployments where a Pingora proxy is exposed to external traffic. An attacker could exploit this to bypass proxy-level ACL controls and WAF logic, poison caches and upstream connections, or perform cross-user attacks by hijacking sessions.\n\nNote: Cloudflare customers and Cloudflare's CDN infrastructure were not affected by this vulnerability, as ingress proxies in the CDN stack maintain proper HTTP parsing boundaries and do not prematurely switch to upgraded connection forwarding mode.\n\n### Patches\nPingora users should upgrade to Pingora v0.8.0 or higher, which fixes this issue by only switching connection modes after receiving a 101 Switching Protocols response from the backend (hash 824bdeefc61e121cc8861de1b35e8e8f39026ecd). Without a 101 response, subsequent bytes continue to be parsed as HTTP requests.\n\n### Workarounds\nAs a workaround, users may return an error on requests with the Upgrade header present in their request filter logic in order to stop processing bytes beyond the request header and disable downstream connection reuse.\n\n### Resources\nSee https://www.cve.org/cverecord?id=CVE-2026-2833. An upcoming Cloudflare blog will also contain more details.\n\n### Credits\nDisclosed responsibly by Rajat Raghav (@xclow3n) through the Cloudflare [Bug Bounty Program](https://www.cloudflare.com/disclosure/).",
+  "details": "### Impact\nPingora versions prior to 0.8.0 would immediately forward bytes following a request with an Upgrade header to the backend, without waiting for a 101 Switching Protocols response. This allows an attacker to smuggle requests to the backend and bypass proxy-level security controls.\n\nThis vulnerability primarily affects standalone Pingora deployments where a Pingora proxy is exposed to external traffic. An attacker could exploit this to bypass proxy-level ACL controls and WAF logic, poison caches and upstream connections, or perform cross-user attacks by hijacking sessions.\n\nNote: Cloudflare customers and Cloudflare's CDN infrastructure were not affected by this vulnerability, as ingress proxies in the CDN stack maintain proper HTTP parsing boundaries and do not prematurely switch to upgraded connection forwarding mode.\n\n### Patches\nPingora users should upgrade to Pingora v0.8.0 or higher, which fixes this issue by only switching connection modes after receiving a 101 Switching Protocols response from the backend (hash 824bdeefc61e121cc8861de1b35e8e8f39026ecd). Without a 101 response, subsequent bytes continue to be parsed as HTTP requests.\n\n### Workarounds\nAs a workaround, users may return an error on requests with the Upgrade header present in their request filter logic in order to stop processing bytes beyond the request header and disable downstream connection reuse.\n\n### References\nSee [CVE-2026-2833](https://www.cve.org/cverecord?id=CVE-2026-2833) and the [Cloudflare blog post](https://blog.cloudflare.com/pingora-oss-smuggling-vulnerabilities/) for more details.\n\n### Credits\nDisclosed responsibly by Rajat Raghav (@xclow3n) through the Cloudflare [Bug Bounty Program](https://www.cloudflare.com/disclosure/).",
   "severity": [
     {
       "type": "CVSS_V4",